Pressure Tactics in Front of Damascus: ‘ISIS’ Redraws Its Presence in Syria ...Syria

Hassan Ibrahim | Jana al-Issa

The suicide bombing that targeted worshippers at St. Elias Church in central Damascus shook Syrian society. The massacre resulted in the killing of 25 people and the injury of 63 others, marking one of the deadliest attacks in the heart of the capital. It triggered a wide wave of condemnation both domestically and from international and United Nations bodies.

The bombing, carried out by the Islamic State (ISIS) according to the Syrian Ministry of Interior, represents a significant shift in the group’s targeting strategy—especially following the foiling of two previous attempts to strike prominent religious sites: the Sayyida Zaynab Shrine and a church in the town of Maaloula. This reflects a persistent determination to attack places of worship.

The Islamic State, which has long opposed the Syrian revolution—branding it as a “pagan uprising”—and fought against it for years, has threatened Syria’s new government. Through this attack, it has reaffirmed its violent ideology, despite the group’s diminished presence and reliance on ambushes and hit-and-run tactics. The bombing was executed at a sensitive moment, as international actors warn that the fall of the Assad regime could provide an opportunity for ISIS to regroup, plan, and launch renewed attacks.

In this report, Enab Baladi sheds light on the group’s activity following the fall of Assad’s rule. It examines with experts and researchers the implications of targeting places of worship, the significance of choosing the capital Damascus, the messages behind the St. Elias bombing, the level of threat posed by ISIS in Syria, the drivers behind its potential resurgence, and the possible trajectories for its future activity.

On June 22, St. Elias Church in the Dweilaa district of Damascus was targeted in a suicide bombing that killed 25 people and injured 63 others. The Syrian Ministry of Interior later accused the Islamic State of carrying out the attack, citing preliminary findings that pointed to the group’s involvement.

Archimandrite Father Meletios Shtahi told Enab Baladi that worshippers initially heard gunfire from outside the church, after which two individuals entered the building carrying explosive devices and detonated themselves. However, the Ministry’s spokesperson, Noureddine al-Baba, stated that preliminary investigations revealed the bombing was carried out by only one individual, not two.

Al-Baba added that the “nationalist stance” of Syria’s Christian community was the primary reason they were targeted. He emphasized the “symbolic significance” of places of worship, stating that the Islamic State aimed to “sow sectarian division” and encourage every religious group in Syria to take up arms. The group’s ultimate goal, he said, was to portray the Syrian state as incapable of protecting its communities and citizens, thereby fostering the creation of sectarian militias in Syria.

A solidarity gathering was held by residents of the city of al-Suqaylabiyah, in the countryside of Hama, in support of the families of the victims of the ST. Elias Church bombing in Damascus – June 23, 2025.(Enab Baladi / Eyad Abdul Jawad)

“Wali of the Desert”… Not “Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah”

A day after the St. Elias Church bombing, the Syrian Ministry of Interior announced a security operation in the cities of Harasta and Kafr Batna, targeting a cell affiliated with the Islamic State (ISIS). The operation resulted in the killing of two individuals—one of whom was involved in facilitating the suicide bomber’s entry into the church—and the arrest of five others, including the cell leader, following armed clashes.

As of the time this report was compiled, the Islamic State had not claimed responsibility for the attack. However, a group calling itself “Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah” (Ansar al-Sunnah Brigades) did. This is a previously unknown group of undisclosed size, origin, or allegiance that emerged after the fall of the regime. The group denied any coordination with ISIS but shares hostility toward the new government. Moreover, the style of the bombing bears the hallmarks, tactics, and mindset typical of the Islamic State.

Noureddine al-Baba, the official spokesperson for the Ministry of Interior, stated at a press conference attended by Enab Baladi that the church bombing cell was directly affiliated with the Islamic State and had no connection to any other ideological or religious group.

He added that the cell leader was a Syrian national named Mohammad Abdelilah al-Jumaili, also known by the nom de guerre Abu Imad al-Jumaili. He was a resident of the al-Hajar al-Aswad area in southern Damascus and was known within the organization as the “Wali (Governor) of the Desert.” Al-Baba noted that al-Jumaili’s video-recorded confessions may be released following the conclusion of the investigation.

The suicide bomber who carried out the church attack, and a second operative who was arrested while en route to carry out a second suicide bombing at the Sayyida Zaynab Shrine, both entered Damascus from al-Hol camp in northeastern Syria. They crossed the Syrian Badia (desert region) and infiltrated the capital following its “liberation,” with the assistance of Abu Imad al-Jumaili, exploiting the security vacuum during the early post-liberation period. According to al-Baba, neither of the two attackers were Syrian nationals.

Al-Baba also claimed that the group “Ansar al-Sunnah” is fictitious and only claimed the attack after the Ministry of Interior released preliminary investigation results. He affirmed that Mohammad Abdelilah al-Jumaili, the mastermind behind the St. Elias bombing, is known to foreign security agencies and is recognized by ISIS leadership for holding the title “Wali of the Desert.”

The arrival of the two attackers from al-Hol camp came amid warnings from several countries about the resurgence of Islamic State activities. In April, The New York Times reported expert concerns that ISIS could find a way to free thousands of experienced fighters detained in prisons run by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), where between 9,000 and 10,000 ISIS fighters, along with roughly 40,000 family members, are being held in northeastern Syria.

However, the SDF denied that the suicide bombers responsible for the St. Elias Church attack had come from al-Hol, dismissing this claim as inaccurate and unsupported by evidence or verified developments.

Four Objectives Behind the Bombing

According to analysts, the Islamic State had both direct and indirect objectives in bombing the church—an attack that could be followed by others. The group has previously adopted similar tactics, targeting places of worship of Christian and minority communities to mark the beginning of broader military campaigns. For instance, following its 2010 attack on the Lady of Salvation Church in Mosul, Iraq, ISIS carried out 30 coordinated bombings in a single day in 2012, according to a report by the Jusoor Center for Studies.

According to the same report, the bombing of St. Elias Church served the following purposes:

Why Places of Worship?

The church bombing was preceded by the Ministry of Interior’s thwarting of Islamic State cells attempting to target the Sayyida Zainab Shrine in the Damascus countryside last January. The ministry later broadcast confessions from cell members who revealed they had planned to attack a church in Maaloula using a car bomb timed with New Year’s celebrations. However, heightened security measures prevented the plan from being carried out.

Places of worship have long been among the targets affected by gunfire and the devastation of war in Syria. According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights, there have been 1,453 documented attacks on houses of worship over the course of 13 years (from March 2011 to March 2024). The Syrian-Russian-Iranian alliance bears responsibility for approximately 86% of these incidents.

Abdulrahman al-Haj, a researcher specializing in jihadist groups and religious movements, told Enab Baladi that the Islamic State, through its attempted bombing of the Sayyida Zainab Shrine, was seeking to achieve two main objectives: First, to highlight the weakness of Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa during the transitional period; Second, to incite Shiite enthusiasm and provoke their Alawite allies against al-Sharaa’s government.

Although the Shiite community is a very small minority and incapable of launching a sectarian war or any war at all, such actions could serve Iran’s ongoing efforts to incite unrest against al-Sharaa and undermine his stability.

Damascus: The Center of State Institutions in Syria

Despite places of worship being scattered across the Syrian geographic landscape, the Islamic State insisted on selecting the capital Damascus and its countryside as targets for its operations—whether foiled or executed. This reflects a significant shift in its strategy. Although its presence has diminished substantially, the group’s activities have remained concentrated in the Syrian Badia (desert) region, adjacent to the Iraqi border in eastern Syria, which serves as a stronghold for the Islamic State. Cells have also been active in northern and southern Syria.

The last major battle between the Islamic State and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—backed by the International Coalition—took place on February 9 and ended on March 23, 2019, in the village of al-Baghouz, in eastern Deir Ezzor Governorate, marking the end of the Islamic State’s territorial control. However, it did not signal the end of its operational activity in Syria.

Researcher Abdulrahman al-Haj emphasized that Damascus is the seat of Syria’s governing institutions. Therefore, destabilizing the capital carries a different weight than attacks in other cities. He stated that such an event is designed to undermine confidence in the current government authorities.

Al-Haj further explained to Enab Baladi that, having lost operational flexibility in the desert, the Islamic State is now attempting to retreat into cities, reactivating networks of former recruits or recruiting new fighters—primarily among the newly disillusioned population, including remnants of the former regime and Shabiha (pro-regime militias) who now find themselves marginalized and under pursuit.

He believes that the group aims to erode the foundations of al-Shara’s authority by targeting Christian support, noting that Christians have shown strong, positive alignment with the new government. The group’s evolving strategy is now clearly focused on urban operations, with a specific emphasis on sectarian targets.

A Historical Hostility

The Islamic State has a long-standing hostility with the armed factions in Syria, particularly with Jabhat al-Nusra, the nucleus of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which led the “Repelling the Aggression” offensive and brought down the Assad regime. HTS was led by Ahmad al-Sharaa, and its dissolution was officially announced in January 2025.

Over the years, HTS has relentlessly pursued cells and leadership figures of the Islamic State. Since 2020, the General Security Service has been active in Idlib, tasked with pursuing wanted individuals, especially Islamic State cells. It regularly announces the arrest of “sleeper cells.”

The Islamic State has been led by Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi since his appointment as “caliph” on August 3, 2023. He is the fifth leader about whom no public details are known, following four predecessors who each assumed leadership after the assassination of their forerunner.

Funeral of the victims of the bombing that targeted St. Elias Church in Damascus – June 24, 2025 (SANA)

In the early hours following Assad’s escape to Moscow and the collapse of his regime, American warplanes carried out more than 75 airstrikes across central Syria. These strikes targeted Islamic State leaders, operatives, and camps to prevent the group from launching external operations or exploiting the situation to reorganize its ranks in central Syria.

In December 2024, French aircraft conducted strikes against Islamic State positions in central Syria, as part of France’s participation in the International Coalition. This was the first such operation France had carried out in two years, according to Defense Minister Sébastien Lecornu.

Warnings about the resurgence of Islamic State activity escalated, along with calls for the necessity of confronting the threat. The issue of counter-terrorism became a key topic in meetings between various heads of state, ministers, and members of the Syrian government. The government also took steps to confront Islamic State cells, most notably the arrest of Abu al-Harith al-Iraqi, a senior leader who held important positions in what was called the “Wilayat of Iraq,” including overseeing foreign recruits and serving as deputy logistics chief. He was implicated in many of the group’s attacks.

U.S. officials revealed that Washington shared intelligence with the new Syrian administration, leading to the foiling of an Islamic State plot to bomb the Sayyida Zainab Shrine. This was followed by a joint agreement among Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, and Lebanon to condemn terrorism in all its forms and to cooperate in combating it militarily, security-wise, and ideologically. A Joint Operations Center was launched to coordinate efforts in the fight against the Islamic State.

Syrian Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra stated in an interview that the threat of the Islamic State persists in Syria, and that the ministry continues to fight it by all available means. He noted the coordination with the Ministry of Interior, which was followed by warnings from United Nations and U.S. officials that the group had shown renewed activity in Syria, regained strength, recruited new fighters, and increased the frequency of its attacks—heightening the risk of instability in the country.

Arrest of suspects involved in the bombing that targeted ST- Elias Church in the Dweila neighborhood of the capital Damascus – June 23, 2025 (Ministry of Interior)

Despite the Decline…

Under the new Syrian government, the Islamic State (IS) has continued operating as a limited-scale insurgency. On May 15, the group claimed responsibility for 33 attacks across Syria in 2025. While this historically low pace would result in only 89 attacks over the entire year—still a considerable figure—it nonetheless represents the lowest rate since the group’s entry into Syria in 2013, according to an analysis by Aaron Zelin, a specialist in jihadist movements in North Africa and Syria.

In comparison, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have carried out around 30 arrest operations this year targeting IS cells in northeastern Syria—a figure lower than in previous years, but still significant. Zelin noted these indicators show that, despite the group’s substantial decline, its operations can still cause serious disruptions—especially during Syria’s sensitive transitional period.

In 2024, the group was averaging 59 attacks per month. However, since Assad’s flight from Syria, that figure dropped by 80% to an average of just 12 attacks per month, according to an April 2025 analysis by researcher Charles Lister. More importantly, the lethality of IS operations dropped by 97%—from 63 deaths per month in 2024 under Assad to just two deaths per month currently.

State Weakness and Sectarianism

Dr. Azzam al-Qusayr, a professor of political science and researcher in Islamic movements, told Enab Baladi that IS activity increases in direct proportion to the weakness of state institutions and authority. Thus, it is in everyone’s interest for the Syrian state to pursue stability and for the military and security apparatuses to be rebuilt in a professional manner, transforming them into national institutions free from corruption, favoritism, and sectarian bias.

Dr. al-Qusayr also emphasized the importance of early warning mechanisms—the ability of the security services to obtain intel and indications of movements by IS and other terrorist or subversive groups. This requires strengthening the skills of security personnel and deepening cooperation and information-sharing with regional and international partners engaged in counter-terrorism efforts.

Nawar Shaaban, a military affairs researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, told Enab Baladi that several factors have created fertile ground for an IS resurgence in Syria, including:

A Risk-Laden Transition

Syria is undergoing a perilous transitional period. According to Dr. Azzam al-Qusayr, the security chaos that followed the swift collapse of the Assad regime allowed extremist cells and groups relative freedom of movement, taking advantage of the new government’s preoccupation with consolidating power and building alliances.

He added that under these conditions, the risk of IS reviving its activity remains present—whether in the Syrian desert (Badia), where it traditionally operates, or even in major urban centers. Given the scale of the responsibilities currently facing Syria’s newly formed security services, it is unlikely they can fully impose control or eliminate all extremist elements at this stage.

This reality makes coordination with regional and international backers in the fight against IS critical—especially since a resurgence of the group would pose not just a local, but also a regional and global threat.

Researcher Nawar Shaaban believes the new Syrian government has initial capabilities, but is facing enormous challenges. Its ability to counter IS, he argues, depends on several key factors:

Political Will: The government has declared a clear stance against terrorism, which is fundamental.

Security Apparatus: Although a restructuring of intelligence and security forces is underway, they are still in the formative phase, lacking full capability to dismantle IS’s complex networks or prevent attacks in advance.

International Coordination: There is a regional and global desire to support Syria’s efforts, particularly in intelligence-sharing and tracking IS funding networks. If such cooperation is implemented systematically, it will be a powerful tool for the government.

Sectarian Divisions: Internal sectarian rifts and divisions among the country’s communities may weaken the domestic front and complicate security efforts, especially if IS succeeds in stirring unrest.

Economic Struggles: The deteriorating economy adds another layer of danger, as some individuals may turn to the group for financial gain or protection.

Overall, Shaaban asserts that while the government does possess basic resources, it needs time and greater stability to fully control the threat—especially as IS has proven adept at targeting symbolic sites that shake public confidence, such as the church bombing in Damascus.

Solidarity vigil by residents of Suqaylabiyah in Hama countryside with the families of the victims of the St. Elias Church bombing in Damascus – June 23, 2025 (Enab Baladi / Iyad Abdul Jawad)

Three Possible Scenarios for the Islamic State’s Future in Syria

There are several potential scenarios for the Islamic State (IS) in Syria, each tied to a range of factors, according to Dr. Azzam al-Qusayr. Chief among them is the extent to which the Syrian government succeeds in consolidating its rule, strengthening its institutions, and resolving outstanding issues—particularly those related to controlling rogue elements and reaching understandings with political and military forces in As-Suwayda and northeastern Syria.

Reinforcing the government’s military and intelligence capabilities, securing its legitimacy, and adopting a unifying national discourse would undoubtedly lead to the containment of any remaining IS cells and limit the possibility of a resurgence.

However, should security violations persist and the gap between the central authority and peripheral administrative areas continue to widen, such conditions could foster an environment conducive to IS and other terrorist groups reorganizing, challenging the nascent government’s control, and expanding their influence at its expense, according to Dr. al-Qusayr.

Nawar Shaaban, a researcher specializing in military affairs, outlines three possible scenarios for the Islamic State’s future in Syria:

First Scenario: Gradual Containment of the Group (Most Likely)

In this most probable scenario, the new government proceeds with a measured dismantling of IS cells, relying on broad intelligence cooperation with regional and international partners, enhanced surveillance of the group’s funding sources, and the tightening of security measures—especially around places of worship and other symbolic sites, which have historically been prime targets of IS attacks.

Still, the situation may not be entirely free of intermittent terrorist operations that surface from time to time. However, these remain limited in scope and are unlikely to enable IS to regain territorial control or establish a foothold on the ground. In this scenario, IS continues to exist as a covert organization that strikes from the shadows, but remains incapable of rebuilding a “state” or imposing local governance as it did during its years of territorial expansion.

Second Scenario: Resurgence of Armed Activity (Less Likely)

A more dire possibility lies in the failure of the new government to establish security and the continuation of internal divisions. This could pave the way for IS to reclaim small geographic pockets, particularly in the Syrian desert (al-Badiya) or in remote border areas that are difficult for security forces to access.

If this scenario were to materialize, Syria could witness a new wave of suicide bombings and sophisticated attacks, which IS would likely exploit in large-scale propaganda campaigns, targeting symbolic locations such as churches or crowded marketplaces to instill fear and demonstrate its ability to strike deep inside the country. However, this scenario would require exceptional conditions—such as a dramatic deterioration in public order or a withdrawal of international support for the new government.

Third Scenario: Use of the Group as a Regional Pressure Tool

The third scenario envisions IS being used as a tool in the ongoing regional power struggle. Certain external actors might exploit the group to destabilize or politically pressure the new Syrian government—not through overt or direct support, but by turning a blind eye to IS activity or providing indirect facilitations that allow it to operate clandestinely.

Within this framework, IS would remain active to a limited extent, enough to provoke security tensions without sparking an all-out war or reclaiming large swathes of territory, as it did in the past. This managed instability would serve the interests of some regional powers seeking to keep Syria in a state of fragmentation, preventing it from fully exiting their traditional spheres of influence.

Pressure Tactics in Front of Damascus: ‘ISIS’ Redraws Its Presence in Syria Enab Baladi.

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