How Iran’s nuclear efforts could scale up after Gaza ceasefire ...Middle East

The Gaza ceasefire will deescalate the long-term proxy war between Iran and Israel, but could lead a weakened Tehran to double down on its nuclear efforts, experts have said.

After 15 months of bloody war in Gaza following the brutal Hamas attack on Israel in October 2023 , a ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas began on Sunday with the exchange of 33 Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners, as well as a surge in humanitarian aid to Gaza.

The deal was greeted with overwhelming relief for Palestinians living under siege and the families of Israeli hostages, and has been welcomed around the world.

But it also marks a moment of reckoning for Iran, which suffered a series of blows in the conflict and will now be forced to rethink its approach to security, experts said – including its nuclear programme.

Dr Rowena Abdul Razak, an academic specialising in Iran, said the ceasefire was a “moment of relief for everyone, including Iran” and believes Tehran was likely to have been involved in agreeing the deal.

Tehran had been “looking for a way to step back from the brink”, amid domestic instability and the weakening of its regional allies – Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza and the Houthis in Yemen – during the conflict, she said.

Iran also lost its main state ally, Syria, when the Assad regime fell last month.

“Iran knows that, while a powerful country with a substantial army and strong regional network, it has been weakened. Israel taking out key leaders in Hamas and especially Hezbollah left Iran reeling,” she said.

“With its own economic problems and internal instability, Iran was in no position to continue the conflict. The Israel-Iran conflict will likely die down a little bit, but will continue long term. The ceasefire offers respite, but not full peace.”

‘Renewed interest’ in nuclear weapons

After a series of blows to its allies and proxies, Tehran must now use the ceasefire to rethink its approach to security, experts said.

Dr Rob Geist Pinfold, a lecturer in International Security at King’s College London and senior fellow at the Herzl Center for Israel Studies, said Tehran could further develop its nuclear programme as a way of deterring attacks.

“There’s been a lot of soul searching at the top of the table in Iran; it previously had a ‘forward defence’ strategy which aimed to arm and train allies like Hamas and Hezbollah in order to push the fighting further from its own borders and deter Israel. This conflict proves that that hasn’t worked,” he said.

“It now has three paths; does it try to hunker down now, support its allies and cultivate an insurgent resistance in Syria; does it open up to the world; or does it pursue nuclear weapons?

“I think there will be renewed interest within Iran towards its nuclear programme. There’s a feeling that it needs another deterrent, and that might be nuclear weapons. That was always the idea – not to use them against Israel but to deter Israel from attacking. Tehran saw North Korea taking this approach and wanted to replicate it.”

Iran’s involvement in the Gaza conflict

Iran has long funded and armed Hamas, as it seeks to expand its regional influence and threaten Israel. It has long referred to the US as “Great Satan” and Israel – and the UK – as “Little Satan”. 

Some reports suggested Iran helped plot the 7 October attack in which more than 1,200 people were killed and more than 250 others taken hostage, and trained hundreds of Hamas and other Islamist militants in the weeks preceding it.

Iran has denied any involvement, and other reports from US intelligence sources indicate that it was taken by surprise by the attack.

After decades of proxy war, conflict between Iran and Israel erupted after the start of the war in Gaza.

In April 2024, for the first time, Iran launched more than 330 missiles into Israel, in what it said was retaliation for an attack on its consulate in Syria. It launched a further wave in October.

In July, Israel assassinated Hamas’s political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. Iran’s Supreme Leader said at the time he considered it “our duty to avenge his blood in this bitter and difficult incident.”

Dr Burcu Ozcelik, senior research fellow for Middle East security at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), said it was “far from certain” that Tehran would seize the opportunity for de-escalation.

She said that the Iranian leadership was split on the question of nuclear weapons.

President Masoud Pezeshkian was elected last July after campaigning on promises to improve relations with the West, but the more hard-line Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) recently extended military drills at Iran’s nuclear sites amid reports the incoming Trump administration could back Israeli strikes against the facilities.

Dr Ozcelik said: “There is a divide in Iran on the question of how to approach the US and its allies on the question of its nuclear program. President Pezeshkian has been more open to engagement with the West, whereas the IRGC and more conservative actors lobby for a hard-line approach as the country braces for the ‘hyper’ maximum pressure offensive that President Trump has threatened.”

Pezeshkian met with Russian president Vladimir Putin on Friday, with the pair set to sign a strategic partnership pact, including a mutual defence clause.

The US and UK have already accused Tehran of providing Moscow with ballistic missiles and drones for use against Ukraine and a strengthening of ties is unlikely to go down well among Western leaders.

“The soon to be inked strategic partnership between Russia and Iran can be read as Tehran’s message to the international community that it has options and may be down, but not out,” Dr Ozcelik added.

However, developing nuclear programme could bring a new set of risks to Iran, Dr Nick Westcott, a former British ambassador and member of SOAS’s Middle East Institute, warned.

“Iran’s next steps are a complete mystery. What is clear is that the axis of resistance has failed and… Iran’s strategic capability, as well as that of its partners, is now severely degraded. Tehran is aware that the old strategy has failed and they need a new one, but the question is, what that should be,” he said.

Dr Westcott said that while focusing on nuclear weapons was one option, this comes with “costs as well as benefits.”

“Iran would certainly come under even greater US sanctions, and it’s not clear whether Russia and China want Iran to become a nuclear power. They both have some hesitation about proliferation even though Iran is presently on their side, because it’s not stable. Its internal succession is unclear, its economy is weak and Iran is more dependent on them,” he said.

“Further nuclear development in Iran could also precipitate proliferation in their region, as with India and Pakistan, and then what have advantage have you got? Tehran could have spent a fortune and have no competitive advantage.”

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei greeting visitors as he makes a speech in Tehran on 22 December 2024. (Photo: AFP PHOTO / HO / KHAMENEI.IR)

In the short term, developing a nuclear weapon could make Iran more vulnerable to attack, Dr Westcott said.

“Developing nuclear capacity could also trigger military action in the short term to prevent it, although they’ve tried to defend against this by digging the technology deep in the ground,” he said.

Dr Westcott said that there would certainly be members of Iran’s leadership “arguing in favour of the bomb, saying it’s the only way to be respected as global power” but that “North Korea shows that just having a bomb doesn’t do that much. It makes people frightened, but it doesn’t make you any richer.”

“There is also still some time before they have an operational and deliverable weapon. This makes them very vulnerable – they’re heightening tensions without the ability to back it up. A key question is: would a nuclear programme have deterrent effect if it isn’t operational?”

Dr Westcott suggested that Iran instead focus on doubling down on support for its remaining allies, increasing its involvement in overseas conflicts to extend its influence, or building new relationships with the Gulf countries to bolster its regional security.

Iran’s allies let down and weakened

Elliot Chapman, senior Middle East and North Africa analyst at intelligence company Janes, said that Iran was likely continue using its nuclear programme as both a “carrot and a stick” for its geopolitical relationships, “ramping up aspects of its programme when it wants to apply pressure to its adversaries, while also offering compliance with the IAEA when it suits it.”

However, it was unlikely to go as far as making an operational weapon, which would “almost certainly invite an attack from Israel, possible with significant support from the US,” he said.

“Iran probably knows this and is smart enough to avoid it, especially as Israel has already shown its ability to attack some of Iran’s most capable air defence systems and create greater freedom of action in doing so.”

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Mr Chapman suggested said that Iran may seek to exert further control over Hamas after the ceasefire – but warned that its allied groups may now be less interested in working with Tehran.

“Hamas has lost most of its cadre of leadership that were close to Iran and those that are left who are pro-Iranian are not as influential in the organisation,” he said.

“If Hamas remains in power within the Gaza Strip, Iran will almost certainly try to rearm the group in the long run but may seek greater controls over the group in exchange for its support.”

However, he said that alongside losing its “crown jewel” in Hezbollah, Iran had “perhaps more importantly lost its prestige as a protector” – and that this could weaken its international position long term.

“Hezbollah was largely abandoned by Iran to fight Israel alone since September 2024 and was ultimately forced to capitulate,” he said.

“Iran was also unwilling or unable to have any meaningful impact on the HTS-led assault on Damascus leaving its long-term support for its allies in question when it matters most.”

There are also questions over the future of Iranian-ally the Houthis, who have been launching missiles at cargo ships in the Red Sea from their base in Yemen in retaliation for Israeli attacks on Gaza.

If Iran pivots away from relying on proxies for its security, the group could see a drop in support, and the Houthis could seek greater autonomy if they no longer trust Iran to back them following its neglect of other allied groups.

However, experts stressed that the group has increasingly operated independently and were unlikely to be working under the instruction of Iran.

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