Jana al-Issa | Hassan Ibrahim | Omar Alaa Eldin
The issue of transitioning from a revolutionary mindset to a state-building mindset has dominated the statements of the new Syrian administration since the early days following the fall of the ousted regime on December 8, 2024.
This desire to transform has not yet been supported by any actual decisions from the government, and it seems that the revolutionary street is not fully ready for this step, as several incidents of assault or demands have been recorded in the name of the revolution rather than the state.
Researchers, thinkers, and activists believe that the transition to a state mentality cannot be achieved through slogans or verbal declarations but rather through a governance system that builds trust between the authority and society, reshapes their relationship, and entrenches principles of justice and equality while holding violators accountable and restoring rights to their rightful owners. The memory of the revolutionary street appears too burdened to be set aside without solidifying the demands it has championed on the ground for years.
Enab Baladi discusses in this report the reasons why some individuals and entities cling to the revolutionary mentality, the role of the government in this context, the obstacles facing this transition, and the experts’ opinions on this issue.
Demands under the revolution’s cloakA few days after the fall of the regime, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa spoke of the transitional phase in front of Arab activists, indicating that the policy of the new Syrian administration aims to shift from a revolutionary mentality to a state mentality.
According to a study issued by the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, transitioning from a revolutionary state to a state mindset requires a series of steps and mechanisms. There is a significant difference between a revolutionary figure governed by the ideology of revolution and a statesman who must be governed by reality and possess the ability to read it, derive from it, and act pragmatically through the available margins.
Assaults and incidents
At the end of May, the assault on Judge Ahmed Haskal dominated the media scene in Aleppo, creating a division in the Aleppo street, leading to counter-protests, including a demonstration at the courthouse rejecting the attack on the judge and another in front of the court demanding the release of the head of the al-Salihine police station in Aleppo, Obaydah al-Tahhan, who assaulted the judge.
Conflicting narratives regarding the incident created this division. Some defended al-Tahhan, accusing the judge of being from the “remnants of the previous regime” and one of the judges of the “terrorism court,” claiming he had issued unjust rulings against revolution participants. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Justice issued a statement denying the judge’s work in the “terrorism court,” and the incident ended with an announcement of reconciliation between them (al-Tahhan and Haskal).
On May 26, the Bar Association in Aleppo temporarily suspended the membership of 64 lawyers due to “evidence indicating their violation of professional duties and principles,” referring them for investigation before the appropriate legal committee and initiating disciplinary court proceedings, preparing for their permanent expulsion if the evidence is confirmed.
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa receives Interior Minister Anas Khattab and several ministry officials – June 9, 2025 (Syrian Presidency)
“Purifying the courthouse” in Aleppo
On May 27, several lawyers in Aleppo organized a protest in front of the courthouse at the invitation of the Bar Association and activists in the city to demand reform of the judicial facility and the dismissal of judges accused of corruption.
Lawyer Ahmad Maznouq stated to Enab Baladi that the protest organized by the lawyers was pre-planned and came as an extension of previous movements that began around 20 days prior, focusing its demands on “purifying the courthouse from certain judges who worked under the previous regime and were linked to security agencies, participating in issuing rulings against opponents and seizing their properties.”
Maznouq explained that these demands do not include all judges who had previously worked in Aleppo, emphasizing the need for differentiation and asserting his support for “peaceful coexistence and opening a new page with anyone whose hands are not stained with blood.”
For his part, the former Secretary of the Free Lawyers Syndicate in Aleppo, lawyer Abdul Aziz Darwish, stated that the decisions regarding judicial transfers and the reorganization of the judicial staff in Aleppo “do not meet the aspirations of the free lawyers,” as he put it.
He pointed out that the judiciary still requires a “true cleansing of its components from judges who supported the previous regime and contributed to imprisoning citizens.”
Darwish added that what is needed is not merely a transfer or suspension of positions, but “the termination of the services of anyone who colluded with the oppression system,” whether through retirement or dismissal from the judicial body because “those who aided the oppressor cannot be just,” as he expressed.
Darwish emphasized the lawyers’ constant position supporting the rule of law, refusing any legal transgression, indicating that “accountability must occur within legal frameworks, not based on reactions or personal whims,” noting that the law contains clear texts that criminalize taking justice into one’s own hands.
Lawyer Omar Yaghn stated to Enab Baladi that the issuance of a decision from the Aleppo Judiciary and the justice department regarding the new judicial formations is “successful,” as it involved the removal of several judges accused of corruption and the introduction of judges described as “free,” who previously worked in areas outside the control of the overthrown regime.
Yaghn considered this “an encouraging step, even if it is not at the level of complete aspirations,” stressing that “achieving transitional justice begins first with reforming institutions, with the judiciary at the forefront,” and emphasizing the need not to settle for merely restructuring the judicial body but to expand the reform of other associated facilities.
Idlib: Demands for the release of detainees involved in violence
On May 26, dozens of people demonstrated in the city of Idlib, demanding the release of individuals detained by the General Security Service a month ago for “participating in the killing of pro-Assad regime individuals,” after they returned to the city following the liberation of Syria.
According to Enab Baladi’s correspondent in Idlib, the demonstrators gathered to demand the release of their relatives who were detained for pursuing those they labeled as “shabiha” (militia) and for killing them.
The protesters chanted revolutionary slogans highlighting the role and importance of Idlib province in the liberation of Syria and the sacrifices made by its residents over the years, pressuring the current government to free their sons who have a revolutionary background and participated in battles against the former regime.
One of the protesters told Enab Baladi, “It is unjust to imprison these detainees for the sake of individuals who collaborated with the former regime. They were involved in arresting hundreds of people, corrupting the country, and unjustly treating the province’s people by submitting false reports to enhance their image in front of the regime, so killing them was their only option.”
“A voice is needed to rectify conduct”
In June, the visit of several artists and actors to the displacement camps in Idlib sparked widespread anger and criticism on social media, as they were perceived as having “not been on the side of the revolution, siding instead with the regime, and remaining silent about its atrocities.”
One of the most notable expressions of anger in the Syrian street occurred after the statement by a member of the High Committee for the Preservation of Civil Peace in Syria, Hassan Soufan, who said that the individual accused of war crimes against civilians, “Fadi Saqr,” was granted “protection” by the Syrian leadership instead of arrest, and that dozens of officers from the former regime were released, with Soufan claiming that “their hands are not stained with blood.”
A military media figure from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (before its dissolution last January) told Enab Baladi that “the free men will not remain silent about any mistake or injustice in Syria from now on,” asserting that any constructive criticism or revolutionary voice at this stage serves to rectify the government conduct, rather than discourage its resolve or diminish the challenges it faces.
He added that the revolution is the kernel of the state and does not contradict its mentality, asserting that criticism, protests, or the diversity of demands across various issues will not cease in a country exhausted by years of war. This is not an indicator of the absence of a state mentality; rather, it represents a shift towards a state mindset rather than a “gang” mentality, as Syria was under Assad’s rule.
The media figure noted that a revolutionary-speaking street does not mean it opposes the state ideology, but the wounds run deep among Syrians, and every individual seeks solutions to their problems and calls for their rights, differing in perspectives between what the law guarantees as rights and what may be seen as a revolutionary urge perhaps based on “misunderstandings and misconceptions of the meaning of revolution and its demands.”
The South African experience
South Africa is one of the countries that underwent a political transition from “struggle and revolutionary political and social movements” against apartheid (a system of racial segregation and discrimination), to a state mentality and conducted its first “free and non-racial elections” in 1994, resulting in Nelson Mandela’s election as president, making him the first black president of South Africa.
The struggle in South Africa ended the apartheid system, which had institutionalized racial segregation and discrimination from 1948 to 1994.
This “struggle, revolution, or revolutionary transformation” included widespread public protests, organized civil disobedience, and strikes, along with political activism and mobilization, and limited armed struggle at certain stages.
Nelson Mandela served as president from 1994 to 1999 (passing away in 2013) and established new institutions, the most significant of which was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, aimed at uncovering past violations and ensuring a peaceful transition. Mandela led the country through its transition from an apartheid regime to democracy.
Despite establishing a democratic system with constitutional recognition of rights, economic disparities and the social legacy of racial discrimination remained significant challenges for the new state, with ongoing issues such as poverty, high unemployment, and persistent economic and social inequalities.
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa meets with members of the Supreme Committee for People’s Assembly Elections – June 14, 2025 (Syrian Presidency)
The Syrian revolution is present.. The path to transformation is delayedTransitioning to state functions and practices does not imply the cancellation, marginalization, or concession of revolutionary ideas; the revolution, in its functional sense, is a continuous and renewing state. However, it means refining the revolutionary idea and strengthening it by integrating it into state institutions, transforming the revolution into a concept and a guide, keeping the revolutionary state as a guiding force for action, and converting mechanisms into institutional forms that fulfill state functions, according to a study by the Omran Center for Strategic Studies.
Therefore, genuine reviews must take place regarding the leadership of the Syrian revolution and its representatives, particularly from the political spectrum, to assess whether they can bear this responsibility or are even prepared to lead a state phase, while seriously searching for capable leaders who can meet the phase’s demands, focusing on the difference between a revolutionary and a statesman. It is essential to recognize that those who have failed to lead the revolutionary movement are unlikely to succeed in leading the transition to state practices, either at the intellectual or functional levels, according to the study.
The state needs a path for transitional justice
Dr. Zaidoun al-Zoubi, a specialist in quality management and governance, stated to Enab Baladi that the reasons some individuals and entities cling to the mentality of revolution are due to the nature of the moment, where blood is still boiling, and anger is still present because the issue of liberation is only six months old, thus the revolutionary mentality is still in place.
However, there are also reasons associated with the meaning of moving from revolution to state, and what needs to happen to ensure this transition. It is essential to understand the government’s strategy in this transformation, which imposes the need, according to al-Zoubi, for public awareness that transitional justice does not mean punishing every perpetrator of crimes; rather, it implies that some individuals will be granted amnesty to achieve goals related to peace, meaning that prioritizing peace over comprehensive justice is necessary. Thus, it refers to transitional justice, not absolute justice.
Al-Zoubi emphasizes that the delay in launching the path of transitional justice contributes to cementing the revolutionary mentality, due to the need for an awareness campaign to explain to people what to expect from this process.
Planes drop roses and leaflets on protesters in Idlib city on the tenth anniversary of their liberation from the Assad regime – March 28, 2025 (Enab Baladi/Mohamed Masto)
The duality of revolution and state does not contradict
The Director of Research and Policies at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, Maan Talaa, told Enab Baladi that the fall of Bashar al-Assad and the liberation of the country are a pivotal and significant step in the dynamics of the revolution that has worked over the past decade with various political, economic, social, cultural, intellectual, and even security and military tools to achieve its demands.
Talaa added that this step comes within a series of a roadmap that ensures Syria’s transition from tyranny and the imposition of one-party governance and suppression of voices to a state characterized by justice and the rule of law, and thus the phase of building is a continuous process within a revolutionary trajectory.
There are generally two approaches to this matter: the first suggests that the act of revolution at this moment should enter a new path of construction, consistent with the revolution.
Meanwhile, the second approach, which has started to emerge with the arrival of the new administration to power, claims that the revolution has ended, and today we are talking about a new phase titled state and the retrieval of state authority.
Naturally, there is a popular divide regarding these approaches, as stated by the researcher. One segment believes that the revolution is ongoing and views it objectively, while another segment believes that the revolution should end, and a new phase should begin.
Talaa believes that the separation here is a political one that must occur between the dualism of revolution and state, indicating that part of the attachment to the revolution is an ongoing act linked to ending all the causes that drove the Syrian community to revolution and addressing the violations and crimes committed by a significant segment of the former regime’s loyalists, especially the “shabiha” and “remnants of the regime.” Therefore, here, the concept of the continuity of revolution is linked to achieving justice that can contribute to enhancing the community’s engagement as a whole in the construction movement.
Talaa confirmed that the delay in launching national entitlements and beginning to activate them may contribute to reinforcing the narrative of continuing the revolution, as the attachment to this mentality relates to rights, especially the rights of victims and the commemoration of memories, restitution, and everything related to the accountability file.
The delay in these national entitlements is not related to excluding this group but is linked to a complex system of political and security factors that exist in Syria. Therefore, an essential basis for a social contract that includes all Syrians must be formed, and calm address of the challenges in this context is necessary, particularly concerning the triad of peace, reconciliation, and justice.
Maan Talaa, Political researcher
Researcher Talaa believes that liberating terminologies can clarify the distinctions in this issue, as the revolution can be seen as one of the tools for reclaiming and building the state. Therefore, it can be said that the revolution continues but is linked to the tools of the state and the necessity of its strength and existence, which ensures avoiding retaliatory movements and individualistic policies.
On the other hand, the state must today alleviate these societal anxieties by deciding to involve this segment in thinking about implementing this agenda and national entitlements, whether through consultations or even reviewing societal visions and resolutions in this context.
It can be said that the duality of revolution and state cannot contradict even at this stage; thus, the revolution can be viewed as one of the tools of the state, within more effective steps for construction, especially when linked with the concept of achieving justice and the rule of law and moving away from individualistic policies.
Maan Talaa, Political researcher
The state is the primary guarantor of a smooth transition
Transferring the revolutionary helm towards institutional work requires having real men of the state; however, at the same time, it requires something equally important, which can be considered the primary guarantee for this transition: awareness and responsibility from the revolutionary (military) side and its understanding of the sensitivity of this stage, and not monopolizing any mechanism that might assist the new cadre. This will only be achieved by accounting for all the mistakes made during the revolutionary phase, and believing in the ability to overcome them through a state mentality and institutions, i.e., it is akin to a phase of redistributing authorities during which revolutionary factions, specifically military ones, will hand over the multiple responsibilities they monopolized over the years of the revolution, whether due to mistrust in administrative-political aspects, aspirations for control, or the absence of institutional alternatives, and entrust those tasks and responsibilities to specialized cadres while returning to their basic roles, separating powers while unifying the goal, as indicated by a study from the Omran Center for Strategic Studies.
Building the new state constitutes a revolution in itself, or rather its essence. The revolution does not end with the fall of a regime; this is merely the first necessary and decisive step, but it is only the entrance to rebuilding the state and its institutions on new foundations, establishing the pillars of a different authority in its relationship with the revolution’s people and its audience, and the ways it exercises its authority and means of working to achieve its goals that should not contravene the will of those who initiated it and their objectives.
Burhan Ghalioun, Syrian researcher and thinker
The researcher at the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Hazem Nahar, believes that the primary condition for the shift towards a state mentality is the actual conviction of the authority about the importance of this shift and its necessity for building Syria, although the interim president of Syria, Ahmed al-Sharaa, confirmed that.
According to what Nahar stated to Enab Baladi, what actually occurred was “the focus on consolidating the pillars of the existing authority instead of taking steps forward on the path of state-building.”
When the existing authority takes genuine steps towards building the state, according to the belief of the Syrian researcher, the Syrian national identity will begin to crystallize among various sectors of the Syrian community.
There are several steps that Nahar described as “important and clear” that the existing authority can adopt to ensure the transition towards building the state, which can be executed simultaneously, as follows:
Reconsider the constitutional declaration to be a constitutional declaration based on equal citizenship regardless of any other affiliations, and based on a clear decentralized democratic system, and the separation of powers. Embark on forming a Syrian national army relying on a national doctrine, open to all Syrians to join, while also involving defected officers in its rebuilding. Allow for the establishment of the Syrian political community through the issuance of a modern party law. Rebuild the transitional justice body relying on individuals and entities with expertise in this field without direct interference from the authority in its work.Nahar considered that the “shortcoming” in everything that could push towards state building will lead to a “gradual weakening” of trust in the existing authority, resulting in the creation of a “totalitarian system” that will gradually alienate various segments of the Syrian community; this may lead to some form of chaos resulting from individual approaches focusing on revenge rather than justice, due to “lack of trust in the presence of a state capable of applying genuine transitional justice.”
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa meeting the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations at the United Nations Jean-Pierre Lacroix in Damascus – June 21, 2025 (Syrian Presidency)
Setting priorities and peaceful opposition
In this regard, the Syrian thinker and researcher at the Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies, Abdullah Turkmani, believes that the transition leadership’s proposal on the necessity of moving from revolution to state represents an important entry point for the success of the transition phase from the “authoritarian” state to the “desired” state that receives acceptance from all segments of the Syrian people.
In this context, we face several questions and challenges: Will the third Syrian republic be religious or civil? Parliamentary or presidential or mixed? To what extent will it guarantee individual and public freedoms, including freedom of belief? And how will the peaceful transfer of power and the separation of the three powers be ensured, Turkmani said in an interview with Enab Baladi.
There is no doubt, according to the researcher, that success in transitioning to a “state of law and rights” depends on “how we deal with the previous challenges and the effective and productive institutions associated with them,” and “the extent of our ability to provide the broadest political and social consensus among all political, intellectual, and social components.”
This consensus, according to Turkmani, depends on the trust and cooperation of the Syrian citizens by ensuring their freedoms and not imposing specific political and cultural orientations on them.
The researcher believes that the Syrians, who welcomed the promises of the transitional phase’s president after years of insecurity and instability, waited to see to what extent “the practice aligns with the values of building a state of law and rights,” based on their conviction that the role of the “modern state” is not only to “exercise sovereignty” over its society but also to “utilize state resources to achieve comprehensive development that meets citizens’ needs for work, housing, food, health, and education.”
According to Turkmani, Syrians have realized that countries vary in their value and the development of their systems according to the level of “good governance of their institutions” and the enjoyment of all citizens of what he calls “unrestricted freedoms,” which include: freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of trade and movement, freedom to form parties and civil and political associations.
The researcher sees that the exercise of national sovereignty by the ruling state authority necessitates “the existence of a competing peaceful opposition to regulate governance,” through its aspiration for future governance and its preparedness to compete in the upcoming periodic elections.
In the context of achieving all of this, the researcher emphasizes that setting priorities and reviewing the goals to be achieved is an urgent necessity in Syria, focusing on the requirements for “entrenching democratic rules, building constitutional institutions, addressing living problems, updating economic, social, and cultural structures, and achieving development and elevating Syrian capabilities.”
Islamic tendencies adjusted by overcoming polarizations
The Syrian researcher Abdullah Turkmani sees clear inclinations to introduce Islamic values, principles, rulings, and practices into the laws and practices of the state, or the existence of what he termed a “religious state, whose primary mission is to implement Sharia.”
However, Turkmani believes that ensuring the transition to a “state of law and rights” is dependent on empowering the transitional phase president with advisory councils composed of capable individuals and a broad political and intellectual majority, abandoning the notion of “sufficing with his men in Idlib.” He states that the economic and social challenges facing the transitional phase require “overcoming ideological polarizations towards utilizing all available resources to rebuild Syria with its men, women, and youth, in addition to weaving strategic Arab, regional, and international partnerships.”
Moreover, it is necessary to assure those countries that the primary goal of Syrian foreign policy is to “contribute to creating a regional and international environment characterized by mutual cooperation, respect, strategic partnerships, and the rejection of extremism.”
The researcher pointed out that the solution to “escaping the ongoing predicament of the Syrian state” is to move away from what he calls “the structure of exclusion and violence” to an inclusive social-political-cultural framework based on productive work, investment in economic and human resources, and increasing them, thus liberating the will of the citizen.
According to the researcher, the energies of the Syrian people should not be directed towards settling scores with the past, neglecting present challenges, and postponing thinking about future horizons, so that matters are not reduced to an “arbitrary” separation between political, economic, and social issues. Syrians, in addition to an active political life, desperately need to ensure an adequate standard of living, which requires comprehensive reform of all state institutions, according to global human rights charters and principles of good governance (accountability, transparency, efficiency), as the researcher said in the Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies.
In order to transition from revolutionary thought to state thought, according to Turkmani, it is necessary to “strive” in the concepts circulated among the president and his aides to affirm the convergence between the various intellectual and political currents and the sectarian and national components, ensuring civil peace and national unity based on “equal citizenship.”
Syria: From revolution to state mindset – deconstructing the duality Enab Baladi.
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