For many years, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has used powerful rhetoric to condemn Israel.
As the then-prime minister of Turkey, Erdogan captured much international attention at the 2009 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland when he stormed off stage following his tense exchange with Israel’s then-president Shimon Peres.
During that clash, Erdogan called out Israel for its slaughter of Palestinians in Operation Cast Lead (2008/09). After this latest Israeli war on Gaza began in October 2023, Erdogan’s strong language made clear Turkey’s opposition to Tel Aviv’s crimes in the enclave, which Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch conclude constitute genocide.
Last September, Erdogan responded to Israel’s killing of a Turkish-American woman in the occupied West Bank by calling on Muslim-majority countries to unite against the “growing threat of expansionism” by Israel. “The only step that will stop Israeli arrogance, Israeli banditry, and Israeli state terrorism is the alliance of Islamic countries,” he declared.
The situation in Syria since Bashar Al-Assad’s regime fell last year has significantly worsened tensions in the Turkish-Israeli relationship. With Turkey and Israel being the two main players to fill voids in post-Baathist Syria, friction between Ankara and Tel Aviv is intensifying.
Many analysts are now asking if Erdogan’s anti-Israeli rhetoric might translate into something more.
A clash of agendas
Turkey supports Syria’s new government, led by interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa. Ankara wants to see Syria’s rebels-turned-rulers consolidate their power and govern Syria as a unitary state.
Based on its own national security considerations, Turkey is vehemently opposed to any People’s Protection Unit (YPG)- or Democratic Union Party (PYD)-controlled autonomous enclave, let alone an independent state, forming in northeastern Syria.
Viewing the YPG and the PYD as Syria’s Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) offshoots, the possibility of these factions governing any part of Syria deeply unsettles both government officials and average citizens in Turkey.
Nonetheless, the historic deal between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Damascus announced on 10 March should assuage such Turkish concerns. Under this deal, the SDF (a US-backed YPG-led militia alliance) is to integrate all of its military and civilian institutions into the Syrian state, cease hostilities, and transfer authority over northeastern Syria’s airport, oil and gas fields, and border posts to the central authorities.
If successfully implemented, this deal will serve the interests of Turkey and Sharaa’s government in terms of moving toward a more united Syria in the post-Assad period, despite the recent violence on Syria’s Mediterranean coast which resulted in over 1,000 deaths - most of whom were Alawites.
Ankara has a vested interest in seeing all Western sanctions on post-Assad Syria lifted so the country can begin moving forward on its path to reconstruction and redevelopment. Turkey would like to see Syria regrow for many reasons.
Ankara does not want to see the Syrian state collapse with dangerous power vacuums emerging as such a scenario could create massive instability and give oxygen to terrorist groups like Islamic State. Such turmoil and security crises could easily spill into Turkey, which shares a 900-kilometer border with Syria.
There is much political pressure on Erdogan’s government to strike an arrangement with Damascus whereby the millions of Syrian refugees in Turkey can return home as quickly as possible. For that to happen in an ethical manner, there needs to be stability and a functioning government in Syria.
Additionally, Turkish construction and manufacturing companies will be positioned to play major roles in the redevelopment of Syria by securing contracts for large-scale projects. Thus, Turkey’s own economic interests are also in the picture.
When Syria’s new president came to Ankara last month and met with Erdogan, the two leaders discussed the future of Turkey’s role in Syria and the shared interests on the part of both governments.
“I think the main underlying strategic point of Ahmed al-Sharaa’s visit to Turkey on 4 February was to align the approaches of Ankara and Damascus to the stabilisation and the rebuilding of Syria into an inclusive and hopefully prosperous and democratic, or democratish, state,” explained Matthew Bryza, a former White House and senior State Department official currently based in Istanbul, in an interview with The New Arab.
“Additionally, I believe the agenda was probably the desire of Turkey to help Syria now begin to resurrect its economy, after stabilising it, by focusing on transportation and energy issues, in particular, as backbones of rejuvenating Syria’s economy,” added the former US diplomat.
Israel, on the other hand, appears to want the opposite for Syria. Tel Aviv has its own vested interests in Syria being weak and no central authority in Damascus governing the country at large. With Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) being the dominant faction in the new Syrian government, Israel wants to see Damascus remain under Western sanctions.
“Israel hopes for a fragmented and weak Syria, based on its calculation that a divided Syria is the best guarantee for its security and a united Syria could eventually pose a threat,” Gordon Gray, the former US ambassador to Tunisia, told TNA.
As soon as Assad fell in December, Israel’s military began bombing Damascus and other parts of Syria while invading the country and usurping control of more Syrian land. Today, Israel’s occupation of Syria has expanded from the Golan Heights toward Damascus.
Israel has called for a total demilitarisation of southern Syria. The Israelis have somewhat recently sought to justify their aggression against post-Assad Syria under the banner of protecting the Druze minority.
This is an agenda consistent with Israel’s record of seeking to fragment Arab states in order to create strategic alliances with mini-states/statelets within these larger countries to consolidate Israeli dominance in the Middle East and advance its imperial ambitions.
On 24 February, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan condemned Israel’s “expansionism” in Syria shortly after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that Tel Aviv would not permit Syrian forces to be deployed south of Damascus.
“The ongoing occupations in Lebanon and Syria, the provocation and attempted annexation of the West Bank, and the forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza are all part of a dangerous plan,” declared Fidan.
“For many years, we have known that Israel has developed a project aimed at creating weakness and instability in neighbouring countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria,” said Ankara’s chief diplomat.
“Beyond this, it collaborates with the United States to prevent second-tier countries from acquiring military capabilities,” added Fidan.
How Israel sees Turkey's role in Syria
Israel’s perception of Turkish influence is a major reason why Tel Aviv has acted aggressively toward post-Assad Syria. Among Israeli security officials and analysts, there is growing discourse about Ankara’s clout in the “New Syria” threatening Israel.
Less than one month after Assad’s ouster, the Committee for the Evaluation of the Defence Establishment Budget and the Balance of Power released a report which summed up these concerns.
This committee, which the Israeli government established in 2023 to evaluate regional threats to Israel, concluded that a Turkey-oriented Syria ruled by Sunni Islamists could be more of a threat to Israel than Iran-allied Syria was in the past under Assad’s rule.
“Israel may face a new threat arising in Syria, which, in some respects, could be no less severe than the previous one. This threat could take the form of an extreme Sunni force that would also refuse to recognise the very existence of Israel,” stated the report.
“Since the Sunni rebels will wield political power by virtue of their central control in Syria, a greater threat may emerge from them than the Iranian threat, which has been limited due to Israel’s ongoing actions, as well as the restrictions placed on Iran by the sovereign Syrian state,” the committee assessed.
Included in this report was a warning about the new leadership in Damascus serving as Turkey’s “proxy” which would make this perceived threat to Israel all the more dire mindful of Ankara’s “ambition to restore the Ottoman Empire to its former glory”.
The Alma Research & Education Center is an Israeli think tank founded by Israeli Lieutenant Colonel (Res.) Sarit Zehavi which researches security threats along Israel’s northern frontier as well as other regional issues. Last month, the organisation published an analysis titled “Potential of the Turkish Threat – Direct and Indirect – to Israel; A Situation Assessment.”
The analysis pointed to Turkey’s increasingly advanced long-range missiles and drone capabilities as a potential threat to Israel, but stressed that “a more significant risk is that it will opt for an indirect threat - supporting a radical Sunni proxy aimed at Israel in a way similar to how Iran handles Shiite organizations, or even supporting the new Syrian army that might turn against Israel”.
The author concluded, “The combination of anti–Israeli rhetoric and a volatile regional environment obligates Israel to continue closely monitoring developments in the Turkish military industry, prepare for the possibility that UAVs and missiles will be used against its territory, and explore avenues for halting the transfer of advanced weaponry into the Syrian sphere”.
Additionally, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar has also accused Turkey of facilitating Tehran’s cash flows to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Israel's lobbying in Washington
Israel is lobbying the US to “keep Syria weak and decentralised” and to allow Russia to maintain its military presence in Syria to serve as a bulwark against growing Turkish clout in the war-torn country.
As part of this lobbying effort, Israel seeks to convince the US to keep its sanctions on Syria. An underlying fear on Israel’s part is that Ankara will protect the HTS-led government in Syria, which could become another safe haven and base for Hamas and other militantly anti-Israeli groups.
“The Turkish-Israeli power struggle in ‘New Syria’ stems mostly from competing visions for regional stability and influence. Turkey perceives Israel’s actions - characterised by military incursions and sectarian manoeuvring in southern Syria -as deliberate efforts to fragment Syria and undermine its territorial integrity, which directly challenges Ankara’s long-standing principle of a unified Syrian state,” Dr Gokhan Ereli, the Gulf Studies Coordinator at ORSAM (an Ankara-based think tank), told TNA.
“Conversely, Israel views Turkey’s expanding influence, particularly its military footprint and alliances with local factions like the Syrian National Army and the new Syrian government as a threat to its security interests and regional balance. Recent developments indicate that both nations are increasingly aware of the other’s strategic manoeuvres and that intensifies a rivalry that is as much about ideological narratives as it is about power projection in a post-Assad Syria,” he added.
Risks of a military confrontation
A host of experts share the same assessment that Turkey and Israel will probably not enter into a major state-to-state confrontation, even if that is a possibility. In any event, tensions between the two powers could fuel serious problems in Syria and thus should be monitored closely.
Bryza told TNA, “I don’t believe that a military confrontation in Syria between Turkey and Israel is likely. But certainly, they are in the midst of a serious political conflict”.
Dr Ereli holds that even if an “indirect military confrontation” between Turkey and Israel in Syria is not necessarily likely, there are “substantial reasons” to be concerned about the potential for such a scenario.
“The complexity of the Syrian scene, compounded by recent escalations and evolving alliances, means that any miscalculation or localised clash could rapidly escalate into a broader confrontation,” he told TNA.
“Such an eventuality would not only disrupt the already fragile security situation in the region but also have significant repercussions for regional stability and international diplomatic efforts,” added Dr Ereli.
Dr Mustafa Caner, an assistant professor at Sakarya University Middle East Institute (ORMER), believes that the risk of any direct Turkish-Israeli military confrontation is “unlikely” in the short term, in part due to Washington’s “restraining influence” on both Ankara and Tel Aviv.
He also noted that with “Israel still dealing with unstable situations and sensitive balances on its Lebanese and Gaza fronts, it lacks the capacity to engage militarily with Turkey, which possesses NATO's second-largest army”.
Nonetheless, Dr Caner told TNA that “indirect clashes and tensions can be anticipated” and that “Israel is more likely to attempt disruptive actions through proxies or destabilising elements, especially since certain factions simultaneously threaten both Turkish and Syrian interests”.
Within this context, the new SDF-Damascus deal can greatly advantage Ankara in terms of the Turkey-Israel power struggle over post-regime change Syria. This is because with the YPG integrated into the Syrian state, Israel would not have the opportunity to support the militia as a means of undermining Turkey while contributing to the further fragmentation of Syria.
Before this deal was announced, the Israeli leadership had been offering “positive guarantees” to the YPG, which would have potentially posed enormous problems for Ankara.
Implications for US foreign policy
For the US, any scenario in which there is a major clash between two of its regional allies in Syria - let alone a war in more extreme circumstances - would be, to put it mildly, unwelcome.
“The last foreign policy challenge the Trump administration wants in the Middle East is another war, particularly one that would involve close US partners whose leaders (Erdogan and Netanyahu) are each on good terms with Trump,” explained Gray.
These tensions between the Turks and Israelis could complicate the picture in highly problematic ways for Washington. The US’s vested interests in post-regime change Syria, which include combating Islamic State (IS) and countering Russia and Iran, could be undermined if there is such a Turkish-Israeli confrontation.
“The potential for misaligned military operations or an inadvertent escalation could undermine US diplomatic channels with NATO ally Turkey and its longstanding partner Israel, further complicating its policy of engagement in the Middle East,” said Dr Ereli in a TNA interview.
“Turkey and Israel are two US allies that currently have tense and crisis-prone relationships with each other,” said Dr Caner, who noted that any direct Turkish-Israeli confrontation would “not be a rational choice” from the standpoint of Washington’s interests in the region. Thus, he sees the US as having the potential to play a role in de-escalating tensions between Ankara and Tel Aviv.
“The symbiotic nature of the US-Israel relationship is widely acknowledged. However, one should not overlook Turkey's role as a regional stabilising force in the Middle East. In this sense, there are specific issues on which Turkey and the US share aligned views. The US will likely seek to leverage Turkey's strength in this regional context,” he told TNA.
Bryza also noted how the state of affairs in Gaza is relevant to Turkish-Israeli tensions in relation to Syria. “I think at the end of the day, if Israel is interested in a sustained ceasefire in Gaza, it will see the merit in Turkey playing the role as, not necessarily mediator, but as a party that can help to deliver cooperation from Hamas. But I think we’re a long way from that at this point,” he told TNA.
Dr Joshua Landis, director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma, believes that it is ultimately in Washington’s interest to rein in Israeli colonial endeavours in Syria as quickly as possible.
“The US should do everything in its power to pursue peace between Israel and Syria. If it closes its eyes to Israel's expansionist goals in the region, Washington will pay a high price in the future, just as it has in the past,” he told TNA.
“President Nixon in 1973 was very critical of President Johnson for allowing Israel to hang onto the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and the Sinai following the 1967 War. Because Johnson did nothing to discourage Israel's expansion, Washington got sucked into another round of Middle East war. Nixon wanted to take on the pro-Israel statesmen in the US Congress in 1973 and pursue a comprehensive peace which would establish firm borders for Israel, but he was too weak and caved into the pro-Israel lobby,” said Dr Landis.
“Nixon's failure to cajole Israel back into its borders led to many more rounds of war and the US becoming the object of Arab and Muslim hatred. The same is likely to be the result of Israel’s most recent land acquisitions in Lebanon and Syria,” he told TNA.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics
Follow him on Twitter: @GiorgioCafiero
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