The Miami Marlins earlier this month designated utility man Vidal Brujan for assignment, presumably hoping they could sneak him through waivers and outright him to Triple-A for the 2025 season. A rebuilding club, with very little to do in 2025 but develop and evaluate young players, had decided that Brujan, a 26-year-old former top prospect, was not worth any additional looks.
The Chicago Cubs, however, wanted to make sure they got him. I have to assume Brujan was going to be claimed on waivers by another club, because the Cubs jumped in with a trade at the end of the DFA window to secure him: Matt Mervis plus cash. The Cubs likely paid the waiver claim price (the cash), and then sent Mervis along so they effectively could be sure to jump to the head of the waiver priority line.
In other words, you can almost forget the “Mervis trade” part of this discussion – this isn’t really about what the Cubs gave up in the trade, because it’s modest and fine – and instead this is about the Cubs specifically going out and getting Brujan during his DFA window. The Cubs saw Brujan was available, and they wanted him.
Why, though?
After spending some time looking under the hood and trying to formulate a narrative for why the Cubs would pounce on Brujan … I gotta say I’m mostly coming up blank. Well, beyond the old standby stuff of “former top prospect, maybe more potential in a new org, switch-hitter who plays solid defense all over and has good speed, and is pre-arbitration.”
All that stuff is true and is probably mostly carrying the day, but you also have to understand that Brujan has no minor league options remaining, so there is no flexibility there. You also have to understand that Brujan has been utterly abysmal in 550 big league plate appearances over parts of four seasons. You also have to understand that the way in which he’s been abysmal – simply not making high quality contact – was potentially very predictable by the nature of how he succeeded in the minors. You also have to understand that the Cubs already have a very similar player in Miles Mastrobuoni, who DOES have a minor league option year remaining (plus Luis Vazquez, Ben Cowles, and Gage Workman, all kind of in that same tier). You also have to understand that there are other players out there available who cover similar needs and project a lot better in 2025.
If just a couple of those things were NOT the case, then I could REALLY understand the Cubs wanting to add some extra depth in Vidal Brujan. But all of those things being true, it’s just kind of an odd move.
The Cubs do need a high-quality back-up infielder, ideally one who hits lefty, and ideally one who could start at third base in the early going if Matt Shaw isn’t ready (or is covering for Nico Hoerner at second). But Brujan has yet to show in the big leagues that he’s even remotely close to big league-caliber at the plate – so why would the Cubs go out and make him as potentially THE back-up infielder addition of the offseason? Again, with no minor league options remaining, and having gone above and beyond a waiver claim to get him, it sure seems like the Cubs have made this move with an expectation that Brujan will be on the Opening Day 26-man roster.
The 2024 season was the best of Brujan’s young career, but he hit just .222/.303/.319/73 wRC+ on the season over 278 plate appearances. His career numbers in the big leagues so far show some improvement, but it’s been improvement from shockingly horrible to merely terrible:
If you stretch to find the most charitable angle to discussing Brujan’s 2024 season, this is how it goes: he was brutal as a pinch-hitter, and that’s simply a lot harder to do than to perform when you are starting; he’s better from left side of the plate; when you combine those things, and look at his numbers as a lefty when he starts, you get … .238/.311/.343/80 wRC+. Still pretty bad!
OK, let me stretch for a better one. Brujan was moved all around this year, in terms of role, but there was one stretch early in the season where he was pretty consistently starting every day at shortstop or second base. It was two months, from April 8 to June 9, and during that time, he hit .270/.336/.396/102 wRC+. That would actually be pretty darn solid for a guy going back and forth between second base and shortstop, and playing roughly average defense at both spots. Relegated to a more part-time, subbing-in, pinch-hitting-type role, he hit just .140/.246/.200/25 wRC+ over the next month and his season was cooked from there.
So, I don’t know. Maybe you look at that window of time, plus the splits, plus his prospect pedigree – which, yes, includes him always hitting at an above-average level at Triple-A – and you think there’s a potentially solid bench player in there who just needs a little more time to click?
Personally, I don’t see it. And there certainly wasn’t anything in his Statcast metrics this past season to suggest there was a bad luck element:
That, to me, looks like a guy who has a good ability to make a lot of (mere) contact, and that was enough – combined with some speed – to put up numbers at Triple-A that are overall 10% or so better than league average. But the lack of authoritative contact means that, at the big league level, the BABIP takes a hit, the walks fall off, the strikeouts tick up, and the ISO drops precipitously (because it’s based less on actual power than on taking an extra base here and there). Big league pitchers are much more willing (and able!) to challenge a guy like that in the zone, and defenses are all the more willing (and able!) to cheat in to cut out some hits and take away extra bases.
We have seen this kind of profile struggle time and again in the jump from Triple-A to MLB. Every single area of productivity gets squeezed about 10 to 20%, and the ISO gets chopped in half. That’s enough to make a 110 wRC+ Triple-A player become a 65 wRC+ big league player.
Obviously the Cubs see something here. Maybe they have some very specific thoughts on how Brujan can improve against big league pitching, or maybe they see his defense at a few specific spots as improvable to “plus.” The decent speed, the versatility, the switch-hitting, the prospect pedigree, and the pre-arbitration cost are all good. No doubt there. I just don’t quite see how the total package was worth a move.
I’m not saying Matt Mervis was a tall price to pay or anything, since the Cubs were going to try to find him a new home regardless. But the Cubs are now using a 40-man spot on Brujan, who has no minor league options remaining, and also included cash in the deal to pick him up. So they wanted him on their bench. That much is clear. Why is much harder to say.
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