Amid a world in upheaval — politically, economically, and regionally — the Middle East stands at a crossroads. More than a year has passed since the genocidal war in Gaza erupted, with no conceivable end in sight. The conflict has spread: to southern Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and even Iran.
In our “Future of the Middle East” series, we convene dialogues with leading current and former politicians, thinkers, and diplomats from across the region and beyond. Their insights, shaped by past experiences and the urgency of today, help us envision tomorrow.
From the origins of the Arab–Israeli conflict, through regional interventions, the rise of non‑state actors, and the deepening complexity of the Arab world, we seek informed discussion. We’re drawing historical lessons to chart a visionary, stabilizing path that empowers Arab nations to rekindle regional ties, achieve economic integration, and serve their interests.
Our discussion framework consists of two parts: First, seven key questions formulated in response to reader demand, centered around the region’s outlook. Second, customized questions tailored to each guest’s background, offering deeper perspective on how the region might pursue an independent trajectory, free from external agendas.
In this exclusive interview, we sat down with Egypt’s Former Foreign Minister Mohamed al-Oraby. He discussed how the recent war between Israel and Iran is a dangerous escalation, with the only way out being the formation of a strong unified Arab front, utilizing an economic integration project that can later foster political consensus.
Interview:
■ The term “Middle East” is a colonial geographic designation — it hasn’t worked for people here, beyond being a convenient label for policymakers. What’s the region’s reality, and how has history shaped it?
– I won’t dwell on the name, as it emerged during colonial times, yet it continues to be used in political discourse.
Alternative terms like “Near East” are used within European ministries, including Turkey, Iran, even Afghanistan.
Terms aside, the real issue is the centuries-long instability. The region’s geography and resources inevitably draw external interference, not only from global powers but also from local states driven by political ambitions. Israel’s establishment in 1948 further intensified these tensions.
Colonial powers left us artificial borders and tensions — look at Gulf states or between Egypt, Sudan, and Libya — deliberately sowing discord to justify future intervention or their covert influence.
■ The phrase “Great Middle East” dates back to Alfred Thayer Mahan (1902), later echoed by Condoleezza Rice amid the Israeli–Iran war. How do you view this vision under Trump?
– A populist like Trump has influenced the world, not just our region. He floated ideas like annexing Canada, seizing the Suez Canal, or creating a “Riviera” in Gaza. He speaks as a global leader, not merely a US president—pushing the “law of force” over the “force of law.”
The “Greater Middle East” plan was devised long ago as a power play, possibly involving Islamist proxies — but it falters here. Iran’s resiliency proves external blueprints often fail.
Netanyahu’s “New Middle East” is merely image-making for Israel; it collapsed at the UN and has no basis in reality – Israel’s actions in Iran will backfire.
■ What roles can regional powers like Egypt and Saudi Arabia play amid these strategic blueprints?
– Each has its sphere.
Strategic integration between Egypt and Saudi Arabia is essential — they are the wings of the Arab world. Their daily coordination on issues like displacement and re-calibrating ties with Iran is vital.
While they may not always move in lockstep, they share an outlook, as shown by a recent joint statement opposing regional military escalation against Iran.
■ Why is there no unified Arab project in response to these regional schemes, especially with overt Israeli threats? Where is the Arab alternative?
– Sadly, there is no true pan-Arab project. Regional powers like Iran, Turkey, and Israel have clear agendas, while we lack institutional unity. Yes, we share a language and culture, but there is no effective Arab Parliament or political mechanism. The Arab League has lost influence because it depends on the sovereignty of its member states.
Yet history shows unity is possible — the unified Arab stance in 1973 and the GCC’s success prove this.
An economic integration project is essential. Each country has comparative advantage — AI, agriculture, energy, education — and Egypt already hosts thousands of Arab students.
Economic integration should be the first step, followed naturally by political unity.
■ How should the Arab world navigate between global power rivals and assert itself without being dominated by a single power that has repeatedly undermined and drained the region?
— I agree that ending dependence on Washington is necessary. It’s premature to declare a fully multi polar world: perhaps we’re entering its early stages, which may last two to 30 years. Russia is currently depleted by its war in Ukraine, while China is ascendant.
But we shouldn’t underestimate America and the West’s resilience.
■ Egypt has historically played central roles in the region — can it continue amid mounting strategic pressures and constant targeting?
— For the first time in its history, Egypt is simultaneously squeezed from four strategic directions, none of which it can ignore. Managing this balance is far more complex than what most countries face.
Egypt navigates this through a strong military and a diverse, if not powerful, economy — but it’s one capable of swift adaptation.
■ If you were to sketch out future scenarios given current challenges and conflicts, what would they look like?
— First, the Palestinian people must be empowered politically.
Second, Israel must be brought back to its natural size — a state that can coexist without regional dominance.
Third, nuclear disarmament is complex now, and regional stability relies on a Palestinian resolution.
We must revive the Arab economic summit (2009/2011/2013), which proved more effective than political summits.
■ Let’s move to the current scene—the Iran-Israel war. What is the significance of Iran’s response by striking US bases following the American attacks on the three Iranian nuclear reactors? Has the Trump administration adopted Nixon’s “Madman Theory,” or was it Tehran that dictated the “rules of engagement”?
– The “Madman Theory” is a very accurate term when it comes to Tehran and Washington, but the situation differs when discuss Tehran and Tel Aviv.
What we saw at the end of this round of conflict indicates that both the US and Iran chose to engage in the Madman Theory. Both sides adopted it, which is reminiscent of the “rules of engagement” that Hezbollah formulated back in the 1980s. The Iranian and American sides carried out reciprocal strikes, seeking to save face. There are even indications of prior coordination.
Trump himself stated that the Iranians informed him of their intention to respond—as if asking for his understanding.
This theory still stands, so long as both parties agree on a tit-for-tat formula of equally powerful strikes that bring the conflict back to square one. It’s possible both sides reached a point of mutual exhaustion and thus decided that neither a complete defeat nor a complete victory would be in anyone’s interest in this 12-day war.
This strategy was essentially endorsed by the US, as escalation is not in its favor.
As for Israel, Iran is not capable of carrying out precision strikes there, and Israel is likewise unable to paralyze Iran or bring down its regime, despite what it has claimed. There is, however, a clear security breach inside Iran—assassinations of senior figures based on precise intelligence, sometimes said to be through phone tracking or via AI technology.
Even though the physical destruction was relatively limited, the psychological impact on the Israeli public is massive—100 percent confirmed. I’ve lived there and understand the Israeli psyche closely.
This scale of destruction will be a heavy burden on Netanyahu when it comes time for accountability.
■ Do you believe that Iran emerging from this round without regime collapse—despite the threats from Netanyahu and Trump—constitutes a victory? Are we witnessing a shift in the region’s deterrence rules?
– Indeed, Iran surviving this round without a regime collapse is a victory: the streets of Iran are euphoric.
Iran has helped redefine the region’s deterrence parameters—some of which it imposed. I believe Netanyahu will walk back his talk about “changing the Middle East,” because the region now has new deterrence equations, and Iran has contributed to that with a degree of political realism.
Israel’s behavior in the region will undoubtedly change in the next phase.
■ There is Israeli propaganda claiming victory, while Tehran is celebrating in its own streets. From a political perspective, how do you interpret this? Can anyone be considered a true winner in this conflict?
– There’s no need to dwell too much on propaganda. No one can truthfully claim full victory in this war. Precise calculations will emerge later. Just as Iran suffered leadership losses, Israel also sustained significant damage.
The political consequences of this conflict will negatively impact Netanyahu’s government in due course.
■ So, we are in a state of open-ended conflict. Will this war bring future surprises?
– Iran will not surrender. In modern warfare, there’s no such thing as total victory or total defeat. This isn’t like World War II, where surrender documents were signed. The situation will remain fluid, and not all confrontations will come through direct military operations.
This war will certainly bring many surprises. It is essential to study how the US administration manages such crises, coordinates its steps with public opinion, and uses media as a tool in psychological warfare.
■ What lessons can be drawn from this war—first for the Arabs, and second for Iran in managing its relations with the Arab region?
– I expect Iran will become more proactive in improving its relations with the Arab world. We will likely see a push in that direction once this round of fighting concludes.
■ Returning to the Arab side—why do some countries continue to host American bases despite public perception that they pose a threat rather than offering protection?
– The main takeaway from this war is that Arabs need to unify around a shared strategic vision. They must rely on a collective internal strength to build a coherent strategy for dealing with both the region and the world. The hardships endured in the Gaza war and now the Iran-Israel conflict should serve as a catalyst for reevaluating our strategy and fostering greater Arab solidarity.
As for public perception—yes, many believe US bases are a source of aggression rather than protection, and that sentiment is valid and understandable. But in reality, the US will not withdraw its bases; it may reduce troop numbers, as it did in Syria, but a full withdrawal is unlikely. I also don’t see the Gulf states abandoning these bases—it’s not that simple.
Israel feels emboldened, and Iran feels it has stood its ground and dealt with both Israel and the US as an equal and with force.
This new power equilibrium will reinforce the US’s desire to remain in the Gulf, particularly since the attacks were coordinated and the US didn’t suffer losses.
■ How do you interpret Qatar’s response? Will this incident damage Qatari-Iranian relations, or was it coordinated and likely to be resolved?
– The Qatari-Iranian relationship is strong. I believe prior coordination took place. Yes, Iran violated Qatari sovereignty, but it did so out of necessity—not as a full-scale breach, but as a face-saving maneuver. I believe Qatar’s balanced stance was essential, because escalation is in no one’s interest.
We are indeed standing at the edge of the abyss—but the point is not to remain cornered, merely absorbing blows. We must allow Iran room to save face.
■ Was the US intent on recreating the Iraq scenario in Tehran in a different form, had it not been for Iran’s deterrence balance?
– Yes, but it was unable to do so because the tools of conflict have changed, and so have the regional dynamics. Our region has its own unique character that often surprises adversaries, consistently defies expectations, and yields unforeseen developments.
■ Some believe that Israeli threats will eventually extend to Egypt, while others are more reserved about that. What’s your comment?
– I don’t believe Egypt’s security is directly threatened—at least not in the foreseeable future. The state has handled the situation with wisdom and precision, managing to maintain its stability without draining its resources. Egypt today faces a volatile border reality, and yet it has successfully contained threats with professionalism.
■ But Israel and other regional actors are attempting to redraw spheres of influence in the Middle East through this war. What’s your view?
– Certainly. Every major conflict is followed by a reshuffling of influence. Things will not return to how they were. There will be changes on the ground, but for now—and in light of the evolving landscape—we cannot accurately predict the scope or nature of that change.
■ So, do you believe what we are witnessing in the region is part of the broader resistance to the emerging multi-polar world order?
– I completely agree with you on this point.
Our region is paying the price for the world’s shift toward multi-polarity. It has become a theater for competition among the three major powers: the US, Russia, and China. Each is trying to exploit the vacuums created by the current war to serve its own interests—whether that means weakening Israel, weakening Iran, or the opposite.
■ Then how can we, as regional actors, fill these vacuums before other powers do?
– Filling these vacuums that are currently being exploited by competing powers requires achieving two fundamental objectives:
First, the establishment of a Palestinian state. Second, the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in the region, including, of course, those possessed by Israel.
If these two conditions are met, they would open the door for Arabs to play an active role in filling those strategic voids. Unfortunately, current regional and international conditions make achieving those goals difficult for now. Nevertheless, we must revive the old Egyptian-Iranian initiative that called for a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction.
This requires supportive conditions and genuine political will.
■ Do we need to revive the spirit of the Bandung Conferences and form a new Non-Aligned Movement to counter American and Western bias?
– That’s true. But if I said that outright, some might mock the idea as a relic of the 1950s.
Still, despite changing global circumstances, we continue to need a revival of the concept of the “Global South.” These countries need joint planning and mutual development. One could say that the BRICS bloc is partially moving in that direction, despite its flaws.
What we need is a form of political, economic, and scientific integration among the nations of the South. This will pave the way for the future. Currently, our region is stuck in the present—floundering in it—and regresses each time it takes a step forward. We must start thinking forward. Just look at ASEAN: despite its nations’ differing political systems, it has achieved remarkable economic breakthroughs.
There’s also the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization, headquartered in Cairo, established after the 1957 Bandung Conference, which includes around 66 member states. We should activate this body and invest in it as a tool of soft power.
■ Does the West still consider itself the center of the world, treating other regions as subsidiaries and suppliers? And why all this Western arrogance toward the Iranian nuclear file, while ignoring Israel’s nuclear arsenal?
– The West certainly still sees itself as the center. That’s clear. But today, we are also witnessing a form of Arab leadership in various fields—particularly energy and technology.
There’s noticeable progress in AI technology across countries like Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Let’s not forget that our region controls key global trade routes—through the Strait of Hormuz, Bab al-Mandeb, and the Suez Canal. Geography remains a source of strength—and also a lure for major powers. What we lack is the strategic use of our strengths.
We must also remember that, in 2015, we reached a nuclear agreement which Iran supported and the international community accepted. The first Trump administration withdrew from it, but it could have been reinstated or modified—had there been political will.
■ So you believe that dominance over our region cannot be achieved through force, as Trump and Netanyahu seem to believe—and that normalization with Israel isn’t sustainable, since the people reject it?
– Absolutely. The real solution lies in Israel returning to its natural size and halting its ambitions beyond its borders. These expansionist aspirations are precisely what bring Israel its crises and prevent its full acceptance in the region or the success of normalization efforts.
It would be far better for Israel to scale back, return to its 1967 borders, and live within them.
■ But the United States continues to support Israel’s expansionist ambitions, even if they are delusional.
– Yes, the US has a distinct vision for Israel. It sees Israel as its forward base in the region and is committed to protecting it by all means. President Sadat said it himself when he remarked that he couldn’t fight the US—a reference to its unwavering support for Israel.
So, we must understand that Washington will not allow a shift in the balance of power that weakens Israel.
However, it may still promote de-escalation by advocating for peace. But domination and control will never lead to peace or stability—nor to the prosperity that’s often promised.
■ It pains me to say that Gaza has been overshadowed by the Iran-Israel war. Could this conflict be used to push forward Netanyahu’s plan to forcibly displace Palestinians?
– There are always those trying to exert pressure on our region from its peripheries. As for the idea of displacing Palestinians to Sinai—we must put an absolute end to even discussing it. Such a proposal is unacceptable. As Arabs and as Egyptians, we should not even entertain the thought.
Merely speaking about it provides fuel to those promoting the idea, making it seem viable. There is no such thing as “relocating Palestinians to Sinai.”
■ Our region is locked in sustained conflict, and peace remains elusive. Are we at a crossroads—either to survive the bottleneck or plunge into deeper conflict?
– A very important question. Unfortunately, one of the defining traits of this region is the prolongation of crises. We cannot say that there are any imminent political solutions to the region’s major conflicts—whether in Sudan, Yemen, or Syria.
It seems our destiny is to remain embroiled in crises and energy-draining confrontations that undermine unity and our capacity for joint action.
■ Why don’t we resort to a joint Arab defense mechanism and establish an “Arab NATO”?
– The term “NATO” carries a controversial—if not negative—connotation in the Arab world. But we already have the Arab Joint Defense Agreement, and we’ve previously come close to establishing a unified Arab force. Egypt initiated this years ago, and we were on the verge of signing—but the project was shelved at the last minute. There are ready-made documents and executable proposals.
What’s missing is the political will.
■ Do we Arabs lack faith in our own power—trapped in the role of the acted-upon instead of becoming active agents?
– It’s not necessary for us to be “active” in the imperial or expansionist sense.
We’re not advocates of interference in others’ affairs. But we must be proactive within our Arab framework—and that’s the priority right now. We are closer to collaboration with neighboring countries, especially in Africa, through various development programs. We have Arab funding institutions like the Kuwaiti Fund, the Saudi Fund, and the Egyptian Fund affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—not to mention institutions under the Arab League.
All we need is to activate these mechanisms and maintain regular coordination to produce a unified vision. I believe we used to perform better under pressure—as we did in 1956, 1973, and even after the 1967 defeat. This continuous violence in the region is inevitable—unless a major political or military blunder is committed. I don’t believe we’ve reached that point yet, which makes this a different situation.
Do you remember Iraq? American generals used to claim, “The Iraqi people will greet us with flowers at the tips of our guns.”
But Iran is entirely different from Iraq.
■ Israel has publicly declared that it aims to topple the Khamenei regime. Will that remain its objective—or is Iran not Syria or Iraq?
– That’s no longer realistic—not now, and not in the near future. I believe Iran will remain intact. The people themselves have already sent clear messages in this regard. So yes, toppling Iran is merely a fantasy in Netanyahu’s imagination.
Of course, there is a degree of internal opposition—evident in the security breaches—but we should not indulge in science-fiction scenarios where the entire population rises up against Khamenei at Netanyahu’s prompting.
The current phase does not include the possibility of a regime-altering event.
■ Do you believe there is a kind of Western arrogance at play here? – Absolutely. The whole world has fallen victim to this Western arrogance, especially after the Trump administration annulled the agreement reached under Obama.
■ In the first move of its kind since the outbreak of the war between Israel and Iran, Israel launched thermal balloons—allegedly equipped with surveillance devices—over Syria’s Daraa province. How do you interpret this use of Syrian airspace to monitor Iran?
– This is a clear step toward tightening control and monitoring Iran’s regional proxies: Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. The objectives are twofold: to contain these arms and then pivot toward direct pressure on Iran.
■ Some argue that Iran seeks only to expand its influence to protect its national security, while others see it as a regional threat. Where do you think the truth lies?
– The 1979 Iranian Revolution and its accompanying sectarian overtones have long been divisive. I don’t believe Iran possesses a chemical or nuclear weapons program. There is an international bias against it. Its influence operates primarily through proxies—non-state actors.
■ And what about the ever-expanding Zionist project?
– The settler-colonial Zionist project is the real danger. It holds both military power and a strategic intent to expand. Naturally, the deeper and more immediate threat comes from Tel Aviv.
■ During Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s second visit to Egypt, he met with the three most senior Egyptian foreign ministers. Was that a veiled message? And how do you interpret the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar tweeting in Persian to condemn the Israeli assault on Tehran?
– Al-Azhar has long studied and recognized Shiism. Politics, however, is not built on sectarian dogmas, and Egypt does not recognize or act upon such sectarian divides. The Egyptian identity is diverse and open.
As for the trilateral meeting I attended alongside Amr Moussa and Nabil Fahmy, it certainly conveyed a friendly message: that Egypt welcomes rapprochement.
■ There were claims circulating on social media that Cairo and Tehran exchanged significant intelligence during that meeting. Is that accurate?
– That is inaccurate. It likely stems from popular interpretations and from the public’s schadenfreude toward Israel: which is understandable given the ongoing genocide.
But no, we did not exchange intelligence in a public restaurant. The meeting was a gesture of goodwill and diplomatic warmth.
■ Regarding Iran and Turkey’s regional roles, how do they differ? And what are the risks of this slipping into a full-scale war?
– Iran and Turkey have pursued very different strategies: Iran has engaged in direct conflict via its regional arms, while Turkey has adopted a “soft infiltration” approach—through culture, tourism, and media.
But both imperial ambitions stalled once they realized that returning to such grand visions wasn’t viable. The more significant danger now stems from Tel Aviv.
Everything else can be corrected and contained.
■ Do you believe there is an opportunity for this region to reach a minimum consensus to safeguard its security—especially given the missile threats against military bases?
– Yes, I believe the opportunity is there. But we must correct imbalances and acknowledge mistakes, because even a single miscalculation could trigger catastrophic escalation.
■ Around the world—from East to West to the Global South—people are increasingly critical of Israel’s self-portrayal as a perpetual victim. Why doesn’t the US seem concerned about this popular momentum or the shift in global public opinion against both itself and Israel?
– I think this is well understood in the West, but perhaps not as sharply as we imagine. There are, of course, furious protests in the West against both Israel and Hamas. Yet ultimately, what determines policy is money and political pressure.
Weapons manufacturers wield significant influence. Massive defense budgets are largely the result of this lobby’s pressure—not to mention the role of AIPAC.
We are now seeing many countries—Germany, Australia, Japan—reassessing their defense budgets and facing ammunition shortages. The whole world is moving toward militarization, because America has enshrined the idea of the “law of force” over the “force of law.”
That is a dangerous development.
Now the world faces a serious ethical question: will it be governed by the rule of law, or by the law of force? Of course, the rule of law is better—but unilateral American legal frameworks have dominated for far too long.
■ How do you interpret Egypt’s messages to the Iranian president? Isn’t that effectively a stance against US and Israeli policies?
– Egypt is not neutral. It rejected the use of force and stood firmly against such policies, while offering political support to Iran—without compromising its principles. This stance was a direct response to aggression and the use of military force.
Egypt’s role is not based on aligning with any side but on promoting peace, stability, and development. It seeks to rally international support for causes grounded in legitimacy and law.
■ Recently, there were widespread allegations that Egypt was part of a campaign against Israel, and even preparing to attack. How do you interpret these claims?
– These are simply unfounded accusations aimed at sowing confusion and casting doubt on Egypt’s position. The reality is that Egypt cannot be dragged into war against its will.
■ The Arab public has lost faith in peace with Israel. What is your take?
– The prevailing sentiment across the region reflects fatigue from endless wars and violence. The solution lies in a regional security framework that guarantees the existence of a Palestinian state—and a safe, secure future for all.
Former Foreign Minister Mohamed al-Oraby to “Al Masry Al Youm”: “The Conflict Between Iran and Israel Is ‘Zero Sum’ — Tehran’s Survival Marks Its Victory Egypt Independent.
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