Khaled al-Jeratli | Hassan Ibrahim
In the beginning of May tensions swept through the cities of Sahnaya and Jaramana, completing their march towards As-Suwayda, which still stands at the heart of a volatile scene where political and security tensions are escalating in an environment charged with fear and uncertainty among local actors and the authorities, who reached an agreement that is threatened by unruly military groups at the borders of As-Suwayda.
The growing division among the Druze elders, and the transformation of the Druze issue from a local matter to a card in a regional struggle, places the future of southern Syria at a critical crossroads. With the fragility of the truce agreement and the absence of a unified reference for the community, serious doubts are raised about the possibility of achieving real stability.
Amid this escalation, the repeated call for international protection by the spiritual leader of the Druze community, Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, has opened a new avenue for debate regarding the limits of international involvement in Syria and the implications of sectarian demands at a time when al-Hijri’s proposal has not garnered consensus in the As-Suwayda arena but rather revealed features of division within it. A segment of the province’s actors views al-Hijri’s demands as a temporary escape from the threats posed by surrounding military groups, while others see it as a threat to national sovereignty and the cohesion of the Syrian social fabric.
Concurrently, Israel has intervened through direct statements discussing “protecting the Druze,” which portends the internationalization of the conflict and opens the door to more dangerous scenarios, especially given the sensitive geographic location of As-Suwayda and the complex interplay of international and regional interests on Syrian soil.
Politically, the repercussions of the crisis do not extend solely to the Druze community but also influence the nature of the relationship between the authority and the local community, and among the different Syrian components. This scene raises old questions about the centrality of the state, decentralization, and the limits of Syrian authority in southern Syria, while these developments evoke real fears of a rupture in a collective national identity if the various parties continue to exploit the crisis within foreign calculations.
In this report, Enab Baladi discusses the background of the ongoing crisis in southern Syria and reviews the local and regional transformations and reactions based on the opinions of experts and specialized researchers.
Jaramana and Sahnaya… A spark for escalationThe spark for events in southern Syria ignited in the cities of Sahnaya and Jaramana in the Damascus countryside, which are predominantly Druze areas, when the government launched a security campaign against military groups described as “outlaws.” This campaign quickly concluded with the nascent state’s control over the area, expanding its security campaign towards As-Suwayda.
In As-Suwayda, the scene appeared different, as dozens of military factions from a Druze background were entrenched in the province, which had previously refused to hand over its weapons to the government or integrate with the Ministry of Defense, raising demands related to the identity of the state and insisting on its decentralization.
No state-affiliated factions or official government forces entered As-Suwayda as they did in Jaramana and Sahnaya, particularly given the fortification of the province’s factions in the eastern countryside of As-Suwayda. However, they accepted an agreement with the government that was later announced, consisting of five points:
Reactivation of internal security forces (police) from former internal security personnel, and immediate activation of judicial control by the local cadres of As-Suwayda province exclusively. Lifting the siege on the areas of As-Suwayda, Jaramana, Sahnaya, and Ashrafiyat Sahnaya, and restoring life to normalcy immediately. Securing the Damascus–As-Suwayda road and ensuring its safety and security under the authority’s responsibility, and immediately. Ceasing fire in all areas. Any announcement that contradicts or exceeds these points shall be considered a unilateral declaration.A Druze delegation arrives from Syria at the village of Majdal Shams in the occupied Golan Heights – March 14, 2025 (AP)
Sheikh al-Hijri… An ambiguous position
Days before announcing the agreement, Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri issued a statement describing the government’s actions in Sahnaya, Jaramana, and As-Suwayda as “ISIS-like takfiri massacres,” asserting that these actions were an unjustified imposition of power and authority.
Al-Hijri once again demanded international protection, considering his request a “legitimate right for a people subjected to massacres.”
Prior to al-Hijri’s statement, another had been issued by the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, rejecting calls for international protection, arguing that such demands are attempts to internationalize issues that should be resolved by the Syrian state’s institutions.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed its rejection of all forms of external interference in Syria’s internal affairs, indicating that the calls made by “outlaw groups,” which participated in acts of violence on Syrian territory, for “international protection” are illegal and unacceptable.
After al-Hijri accepted the points of the agreement, the official page of the Druze religious council confirmed the outcomes of a meeting that took place with the presence of al-Hijri, the Sheikhs of the Mind, Youssef al-Jarbou’ and Hamoud al-Hanawi, Prince Hassan al-Atrash, Prince Yahya Amer, representatives of military factions, and other local dignitaries.
Al-Hijri did not change his tone towards Damascus, but his latest three statements did not include demands for international protection, contrary to previous statements. In his most recent statement, he called for unity with the Bedouin tribes residing in the countryside of As-Suwayda, reaching up to Daraa.
Al-Jarbou’ and al-Hanawi: Attempts at de-escalation
Unlike the harsh stance taken by al-Hijri from Damascus, the two Sheikhs of the Mind, Youssef al-Jarbou’ and Hamoud al-Hanawi, rushed to Damascus at the onset of the events in Sahnaya and Jaramana. They played a role alongside the leader of the Sheikh of Dignity forces, Sheikh Laith al-Balous, in de-escalation efforts and reaching an agreement through mediation and understanding with the leadership of the Daraya area in the rural Damascus region (adjacent to Sahnaya).
Numerous reports circulated on social media about a disagreement that erupted between Sheikh al-Balous and Sheikh al-Hijri following the agreement, prompting military factions that consider al-Hijri their reference to besiege locations belonging to al-Balous’ Sheikh of Dignity forces. However, neither party confirmed this information.
Sheikh al-Balous did not respond to inquiries from Enab Baladi regarding confirmation or denial of these reports.
For his part, Sheikh Hamoud al-Hanawi, one of the Druze Sheikhs of the Mind, rejected any foreign intervention in Syrian affairs, affirming that Druze are an integral part of the national fabric of Syria and have never been a tool in the hands of any foreign entity.
He added during a televised interview with the official Alikhbaria channel that “belonging to the homeland is a badge of honor and dignity that cannot be bargained,” calling for the strengthening of unity among all Syrians, regardless of sectarian or ethnic affiliations.
He expressed concern about the recent events in Syria, especially in the Syrian coast, deeming them harmful to everyone and negatively impacting trust among Syrians.
Sheikh al-Hanawi expressed support for any agreement that contributes to unifying the Syrian ranks.
In a similar vein, Sheikh Youssef al-Jarbou’, the Druze cleric in Syria, conveyed clear positions regarding the current events in the As-Suwayda region, emphasizing the importance of national unity, rejecting foreign interventions, and activating the role of official institutions in the governorate.
He expressed his rejection of Israeli interventions in Syrian affairs, considering that Israel exploits the Druze for political gains and attempts to use the sect as a pressure card to achieve its goals in Syria.
Between openness to the state and rejection of interventionsThe swift developments at both the security and political levels in As-Suwayda, which continue to unfold, came amid efforts to contain tensions and open channels for communication with state institutions. Meanwhile, the people of the governorate remain open to the emerging state institutions, since December 8, 2024, when the fall of the Syrian regime was announced. The actors of the governorate continue to seek cooperation with the Syrian government in various fields, according to political researcher Jamal al-Shoufi, who hails from and resides in As-Suwayda.
Al-Shoufi explained during his talk with Enab Baladi that understandings took place between local factions and the Ministries of Interior and Defense, focusing on restoring security through three main points: police, judicial control, and public security, ensuring that personnel are from As-Suwayda, while leadership positions are assigned to individuals from outside the governorate to maintain national balance.
He pointed out that the agreement partially stumbled concerning the implementation of the General Security point due to widespread popular rejection of the idea of a security apparatus in As-Suwayda, fearing the potential security pursuit of many supposed wanted individuals within the governorate. He noted that matters related to the police and judicial control remain unimpeded, conditional only on subjecting personnel to prior security checks to ensure their integrity.
Al-Shoufi considered that calls for international protection raised in some circles “do not represent the true will of the people of As-Suwayda,” describing them as “misguided demands, not based on realistic political analysis, and isolating As-Suwayda from its national surroundings.” He called for supporting Syrian-Syrian dialogue through media channels and direct meetings that include all components, emphasizing the importance of encouraging authorities, opposition, and civil society to pursue a comprehensive national understanding.
Security escalation and civil de-escalation
The recent closure of the Damascus-As-Suwayda road, led to shortages in supplies and difficulties for students returning from universities. Additionally, reciprocal assaults occurred between armed factions, raising sectarian tensions amid a growing media incitement campaign from both sides.
Al-Shoufi argued, during his talk with Enab Baladi, that the intervention of “wise figures” contributed to restoring calm and activating the announced agreements to secure the international road, protect the city from uncontrolled factions, and halt military operations across the Syrian landscape. He noted that these provisions require opening channels for national dialogue and activating the law to deter any sectarian incitement.
He stressed the danger of reducing As-Suwayda to a single sectarian block, stating that diversity and difference are healthy phenomena, and the residents of the governorate should not be portrayed as a homogenous group, either religiously or politically.
The intervention of wise figures has contributed to restoring calm to As-Suwayda and activating the announced agreements that stipulate securing the international road, protecting the city from uncontrolled factions, and halting military operations across the Syrian landscape. Implementing these provisions requires opening channels for national dialogue and activating the law to deter any sectarian incitement.
Jamal al-Shoufi, Political researcher living in As-Suwayda
The increase of Israeli intervention has heightened tensions
The notable escalation in tension has been exacerbated by the increase in Israeli interventions, with the Israeli forces carrying out a series of airstrikes and ground incursions targeting Syrian military sites. This has resulted in civilian casualties and the displacement of hundreds of residents, particularly in the Quneitra and Daraa regions, since the fall of the regime.
The frequency of Israeli strikes in Syria has intensified with the outbreak of confrontations in Sahnaya between local factions and government forces, as Israel has targeted the area from the air, repeatedly striking government forces and expanding its attacks to include the countryside of As-Suwayda.
Israel has justified these operations as aimed at preventing the entry of “hostile forces” into the Druze areas; however, these justifications have not been widely accepted and are considered an attempt to exploit sectarian divisions and fuel internal conflicts, thus raising tensions in the region.
Israeli movements have provoked international reactions, as the UN envoy to Syria, Geir Pedersen, expressed deep concern and condemned the Israeli attacks, calling for an immediate halt and emphasizing the need to respect international law and Syria’s sovereignty.
In light of these developments, leaders of the Druze community warned against using their cause as a pretext for external interventions, stressing the necessity of calm and prioritizing diplomatic solutions, including Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and Syrian Druze sheikhs.
Buses carrying men from the Druze community in Syria arrive in the village of Majdal Shams in the occupied Golan Heights – March 14, 2025 (AP)
“International protection” … a complicated requestSimultaneously with the start of the National Dialogue Conference last February, Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri expressed his dissatisfaction with the preparations and called for “international intervention to ensure that the process leads to a civil state, with the separation of powers and the rule of law.”
During clashes in Jaramana, Sahnaya, and As-Suwayda, al-Hijri called for “international protection,” deeming it a “legitimate right for a people subjected to massacres,” urging the international community not to ignore the “horrors” occurring in Syria.
According to a statement on May 1, he contended that what he described as “mass murder,” as occurred on the Syrian coast, requires no committees but rather “immediate” intervention by international forces “to maintain peace,” emphasizing his lack of trust in the Syrian government and government military forces.
Calls for international protection have been met with an official Syrian rejection, deeming them illegitimate requests and a clear attempt to “internationalize” a situation that should be “handled exclusively within the state institutions” of Syria. The actions represent a direct threat to national unity and jeopardize national efforts to restore security and stability throughout Syria, according to a statement from the Syrian Foreign Ministry.
Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani described these calls as serving agendas unrelated to the aspirations of the Syrian people, asserting that any call for external intervention, under any pretext or slogan, will only lead to more deterioration and division.
The request for international protection has long been complicated and fraught with political, legal, and diplomatic obstacles. Over the past 14 years, Syria has been a model case for applying the principle of international responsibility to protect. The core objective of this principle is to protect civilians from human rights violations and international crimes when a state is unable or unwilling to protect its population, according to research by Dr. Ghuna Bdiwi, an attorney and researcher in international criminal law and human rights law.
Bdiwi believes that various political and legal reasons have hindered the adequate realization of this goal to avoid the Syrian tragedy. Additionally, there are two important logistical aspects that need to be addressed regarding the principle of international responsibility to protect: the ambiguity surrounding the criteria necessary for intervention, and the mechanism of voting on decisions in the Security Council.
Several notable figures and social personalities in As-Suwayda during a meeting to reach a preliminary agreement on a ceasefire in Jaramana and Ashrafiyat Sahnaya in rural Damascus – April 30, 2025 (SANA)
International protection … a negotiating tool or diplomatic pressure?Dr. Nader al-Khalil
Syrian political researcher
After the fall of the previous Syrian regime, the demands of Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri for international protection emerged as one of the most complicated political files in the new Syrian landscape.
Despite the new Syrian government’s rejection of this demand and its classification as illegitimate, the repeated mention of it reflects a political strategy aimed at strengthening al-Hijri’s negotiating position with Damascus.
The political dimension of the demand
The demand for international protection acts as a pressure tool that al-Hijri attempts to exploit against the government in Damascus, taking advantage of the unstable security conditions and the challenges faced by the new authority. Often, al-Hijri seeks through this proposal to:
Enhance his negotiating position with the Syrian government by highlighting/exploiting certain security concerns of the Druze community. Gain international support, whether through human rights institutions like the UN Human Rights Council or through Western diplomatic channels. Emphasize the need to protect minorities, a discourse that can resonate with the international community, especially amid ongoing internal tensions.Why the proposal is repeated despite its complexity
Despite the difficulty of implementing the international protection scenario for legal and political reasons, the repeated mention reflects several factors:
Pressure on the Syrian government: The threat of this demand places Damascus in a diplomatic challenge, requiring it to provide international guarantees against the need for external intervention. Keeping the issue alive in international circles: Continued discussion of international protection ensures that the As-Suwayda file remains on the agenda of international discussions, potentially opening avenues for diplomatic interventions or even political pressure on the Syrian government. Possibility of legal escalation: Filing lawsuits before international institutions could represent an additional pressure tool, especially if evidence of human rights violations against civilians in As-Suwayda is presented.The impact on the Syrian government
The escalation and continuation of this course may exert painful pressure on the Syrian government, especially if adopted by influential international entities. In the event of reaching extreme levels of escalation, it could lead to:
International diplomatic intervention, through the imposition of sanctions or political pressure on Damascus. International legal action, such as filing complaints before the Human Rights Council or the International Court of Justice. The possibility of limited military intervention. Although this scenario remains weak, it is plausible if security tensions escalate.The response of the Syrian government
Conversely, the Syrian government needs to take serious steps to convince the international community that the Druze do not need international protection by:
Providing clear security guarantees for the Druze community. Enhancing internal dialogue with local leaders in As-Suwayda. Taking political and diplomatic measures to prevent the internationalization of the issue.In the end, the request for international protection remains a strong negotiating tool in the hands of Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, despite the difficulty of achieving it practically. However, merely waving it around exerts pressure on the Syrian government, which finds itself compelled to respond with political and diplomatic decisions to avoid any potential international escalation.
In summary, this demand serves as a pressure tool that al-Hijri aims to activate against the government in Damascus to enhance his negotiating capabilities with it through various channels.
Despite the challenges of implementing this scenario (international protection), the trajectory toward requesting it may become a painful pressure tool for the government if escalated, such as raising lawsuits or demands before international institutions, like the United Nations Human Rights Council. If this path reaches its extremes, although a low probability, it may lead to international diplomatic intervention or even limited military action. Therefore, the suggestion of escalating this path undoubtedly serves as pressure on the government in Damascus, which, in turn, needs to take serious steps to convince the international community of the Druze’s ability to ensure their own protection.
Deployment of General Security Forces in the al-Soura Area of As-Suwayda – May 1, 2025 (As-Suwayda governorate)
A new card in Israeli calculationsSince the fall of Assad’s regime on December 8, 2024, Israeli escalation in Syria has increased under several pretexts. Israel began to infiltrate and destroy the military arsenal of the ousted regime, claiming fears of it falling into the hands of “extremists,” according to its statements, to protect its security and citizens, and concerns over the growing Turkish influence in the Syrian arena.
The latest Israeli pretext was “protecting the Druze,” coinciding with clashes in Jaramana, Sahnaya, and As-Suwayda, where Israeli aircraft conducted airstrikes on various areas, notably targeting a point near the presidential palace in the Syrian capital, Damascus.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Israel Katz stated that the army attacked a target near the palace, renewing their commitment to protect members of the Druze minority after expressing readiness to intervene against any threat to the Druze.
Some of the strikes, described by Israel as “warning operations and serious messages” to the Syrian leadership, imply that it should expect Israel “to act to prevent harm to the Druze.” This contradicts the Syrian reality, given the years of Druze presence in Idlib city under the previous rule of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Salvation Government before Assad’s fall.
According to statistics obtained by Enab Baladi from the Directorate of Minorities Affairs in the Salvation Government, as of September 2024, the Druze population in Idlib numbered 11,115 individuals, distributed across 16 Druze villages, including Kaftin, Kfarbni, Banabel, Qalb Lawza, Kfarkila, Abreetta, and Jidain.
Members of the Druze community faced violations in Idlib, but these decreased gradually over the years. After Ahmed al-Sharaa’s visit to the Jabal al-Summaq area in 2022, he pledged to restore rights to their owners. Furthermore, the HTS returned seized homes and lands to some residents, unless the owner was involved in violations or affiliated with regime forces or militias close to them.
The Israeli justification (protecting the Druze) was followed by a statement from Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa about the existence of indirect negotiations through intermediaries to reduce escalation between Syria and Israel, aimed at “calming the situation and preventing it from spiraling out of control.”
On May 8 of this year, a third round of negotiations took place between Turkey and Israel in Baku, Azerbaijan, involving senior officials, regarding Turkey’s role in Syria.
Political analyst and researcher at the Jusoor for Studies Center, Wael Alwan, told Enab Baladi that since the fall of Assad’s regime, Israel has been working hard on a project to make Syria a weapon-free state, investing in the continuation of chaos, and creating a perception that delays the lifting of sanctions and the political opening towards the new administration in Syria.
He added that Israel has worked on stirring chaos in multiple files, including the exploitation of a small part of the Druze component in As-Suwayda, making this part seek external protection from Israel and communicate with it. He pointed out that today’s situation in As-Suwayda cannot be reduced to just part of the component, as the loudest voice in As-Suwayda is against this notion.
Alwan believes that Israel has leveraged the “protecting the Druze” justification not only to stir chaos but also to continue its plan to destroy certain military sites and infrastructure in Syria. Thus, it targeted locations in Sahnaya under the pretext of “protecting the Druze,” and subsequently hit several military sites in Daraa, Damascus, Hama, and Latakia.
Israel has worked on creating chaos in various files and making part of the Druze component in As-Suwayda seek external protection, but the general sentiment in the province firmly rejects this idea.
Wael Alwan, Researcher at the Jusoor for Studies Center
According to Alwan, Israel relies on these strategies to create a suitable environment for itself in its surroundings, ensuring that non-state entities do not become strong and preventing the central state from exerting pressure or negotiating from a position of strength.
Regarding the existence of indirect talks between Syria and Israel, Alwan views that they cannot proceed currently in a direct manner due to the significant Israeli aggression, but there exists an opportunity for a genuine de-escalation process if Israel responds positively to the intermediaries, amidst Western and Arab pressure.
If Israel ceases its escalation policy in Syria, there may be negotiations to return to a ceasefire and adhere to the disengagement agreement of 1974, or to reframe such an agreement, according to the researcher.
On May 7 of this year, security sources told Reuters that the United Arab Emirates established a channel for talks between Israel and Syria as the Syrian government seeks regional assistance in managing its relationship with Israel, which has taken hostile actions against Syria in recent months.
The agency reported, citing a Syrian security source and an unnamed regional intelligence official, that the previously undisclosed indirect communications focus on security, intelligence issues, and building trust between Syria and Israel, which do not maintain official relations.
The first source described the efforts that began days after Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s visit to the UAE on April 13, as currently focusing on “technical issues,” stating that there are no limits to what may ultimately be discussed.
Israel escalates tensions in southern Syria Enab Baladi.
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