The limited deployment of Pyongyang’s soldiers in Kursk managed to avoid a lot of potential pitfalls
On April 26, 2025, during a report to Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov mentioned that, in Kursk Region, soldiers of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) operated alongside Russian servicemen.
“Soldiers and officers of the Korean People’s Army, fulfilling combat missions shoulder to shoulder with Russian servicemen, demonstrated high professionalism, resilience, courage, and heroism in battle while repelling the Ukrainian invasion,” Gerasimov stated.
The next day, the Central Military Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea issued a statement saying that “The victorious completion of the operation to liberate areas of the Kursk region is a triumph of justice over injustice, and a new chapter in history demonstrating a strong military alliance between the DPRK and Russia – the highest strategic level of allied and brotherly relations between the peoples of the two countries.”
It was noted that the decision to deploy DPRK military units was made by Kim Jong-un based on the provisions of the Russia-DPRK Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty.
On April 28, Russian President Vladimir Putin personally referenced the KPA fighters:
“The Russian people will never forget the feat of the Korean special forces fighters. We will always honor the Korean heroes who gave their lives for Russia, for our common freedom, on par with their Russian brothers-in-arms,” according to a statement on the Kremlin’s website. Putin thanked Kim Jong Un for deploying troops in support of the war with Ukraine, promising that their bilateral friendship, forged on the battlefield, would continue to strengthen.
Read more Brothers in arms: Inside North Korea’s deployment to RussiaSouth Korea and the United States immediately condemned the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia, calling it a violation of UN Security Council resolutions prohibiting military cooperation with Pyongyang. Seoul accused Pyongyang of mocking the international community and called for an immediate withdrawal of troops from Russia. A US State Department spokesperson blamed “North Korea” and other third countries for “perpetuating the Russia-Ukraine war,” adding that the deployment of DPRK troops to Russia and any Russian compensation in return must end.
As it happened
On June 19, 2024, Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un signed the Treaty on Comprehensive Partnership between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Article 4 of the treaty provided for the immediate military assistance by all available means in the event that “one of the parties finds itself in a state of war due to an armed attack by one or more states.” As emphasized by the Russian Foreign Ministry, this clause represented an “exclusively defensive position.” Although Western and South Korean media immediately began discussing the possibility of military action, the reference to a “state of war” implied a very specific definition of conflict.
In the early morning of August 6, 2024, the Armed Forces of Ukraine invaded Kursk Region, which altered the course of the Russian campaign and created the conditions for appealing to Pyongyang for assistance – the “core” territory of the Russian Federation had come under aggression.
On November 1, 2024, during negotiations in Moscow with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, DPRK Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui officially confirmed for the first time that Pyongyang was providing assistance to Moscow: “From the very beginning of the special military operation, the respected Comrade Chairman of State Affairs Kim Jong-un instructed us to unwaveringly and powerfully support and assist the Russian army and the Russian people in their sacred war, without regard to others.”
That same month, the treaty was ratified. It is believed that around this time, Kim Jong-un concluded that “the emerging wartime situation met the conditions for activating Article 4 of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the DPRK and the Russian Federation,” and decided to involve North Korea’s armed forces in the war, notifying the Russian side of his decision.
Shortly afterward, the first KPA fighters appeared at Russian training grounds. The exact number of military personnel remains unknown, but according to estimates by South Korea’s National Intelligence Service, over 10,000 troops were sent to Russia in the fall of 2024, and another 3,000 in the winter of 2025. Given the likelihood of rotation, this is not a very large number.
Read more Russia would help defend North Korea – KremlinAt the same time, starting at a certain point, the Russian authorities neither confirmed nor denied information about the presence of North Korean forces, consistently avoiding direct answers. Meanwhile, in Ukrainian propaganda, the topic of North Korea began to gain traction as early as the beginning of October.
On April 24, 2025, the DPRK’s leading newspaper, Rodong Sinmun, published an article dedicated to the sixth anniversary of the first summit between Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un. The article stated that the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership had created a “guarantee for preserving peace and security on the Eurasian continent.” It further emphasized that “the DPRK and Russia are strengthening cooperation, jointly enhancing defense against the reckless conspiracies of hostile forces, and will build a new world together based on the new treaty.”
The piece asserted that “the vile attempts of hegemonic forces, which sought to plunge Eurasia into chaos through confrontation and war, are being thwarted. The changing era and the complex international situation clearly prove that developing strong friendly relations was the right decision.”
Why North Korean forces were sent to the Kursk Region
Setting aside the Western propaganda narrative that “things are going so poorly at the frontline that Moscow cannot succeed without help from allies,” and without access to classified information, two interrelated reasons behind this decision can be identified.
The first reason relates to the way the military operation is being conducted by the Russian side. Aiming to place minimal wartime burdens on society and to involve as few unwilling participants as possible, the Russian leadership strives to keep the military operation and civilian life separate – avoiding mobilization and waging a war of attrition while preserving its own personnel as much as possible. This approach makes the campaign protracted and slow, whereas achieving decisive successes requires additional, well-prepared human resources.
The second reason stems from Article 8 of the Russia-DPRK Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: “The Parties shall establish mechanisms for conducting joint activities aimed at strengthening defense capabilities in the interest of preventing war and ensuring regional and international peace and security.”
One of the shortcomings of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) is its insufficient training and preparedness for the specific demands of modern warfare, which became evident during the Russian military operation. The KPA possesses a certain reputation and many strengths; however, that reputation is largely based on past narratives and/or displays of individual martial prowess – demonstrations that do not necessarily correlate with the skills required to survive in modern combat, where what matters most is not the ability to break bricks with one’s head, but the ability to dodge FPV drones.
Read more Putin thanks North Korean soldiersDespite all its strengths, the KPA lacks experience in the kind of modern warfare that the Russian army is currently gaining.
Additionally, a shortage of resources – caused by economic isolation and the aftermath of the “Arduous March” – has led to a chronic lack of fuel and spare parts, preventing the KPA from regularly conducting large-scale exercises across all branches of the military, such as those held by South Korea or in joint US–South Korean drills. There is also no known record of regular command-and-staff exercises aimed at cultivating officers and generals en masse who are prepared for modern warfare.
Of course, the lack of real combat experience is characteristic of both North and South Korea (the only countries to have been consistently engaged in military action since the early 21st century are Russia, the US, and Israel). Nevertheless, such circumstances may lead to an insufficient understanding – especially at the middle and lower levels – of the demands of contemporary warfare, even though Kim Jong Un, who has received a military education, is well aware of what conducting war in the modern age entails.
Therefore, the military cooperation between the two countries was aimed at enriching the KPA with practical experience, with their deployment in Kursk Region serving as a kind of final internship. Initially, the focus was on training at military ranges, familiarizing troops with new weaponry and updated protocols (for instance, the advent of drones altered the previously standard reaction to the command “Air!” traditionally used to alert personnel of approaching bombers). Only afterward was this experience reinforced under combat conditions. It is claimed that even their deployment to the front line was gradual, beginning with assigning them to relieve duties in the rear.
It is important to note that although the military operation spans several fronts, North Korean forces did not cross Russia’s “old” borders. In this author’s view, this was also due to several reasons.
First, the legal basis for the participation of the DPRK military in combat operations was laid out in the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Article 4 of the document explicitly states that in the event of an armed attack on one of the parties, the other is obliged to immediately provide military and other assistance using all available means. Repelling an attack on Russia’s core territory fits within this definition.
Second, this limitation curtails the potential of Ukrainian propaganda to depict “atrocities against civilians” or to portray efforts to capture or persuade North Korean soldiers to defect and be used in propaganda campaigns.
Third, the small size of the contingent and the limited scope of their mission helped avoid a number of problems and risks that might have arisen had the cooperation been structured differently.
Read more Kim Jong-un promises monument to heroes fallen in Kursk RegionConcerns that did not materialize
What problems were largely avoided? Let’s begin with the technical challenges of integrating the KPA with the Russian Armed Forces.
The deployment of a large, entirely foreign contingent into the military operation zone – especially if introduced into combat without prior preparation – would have caused numerous administrative, logistical, and even communication difficulties, particularly due to the number of interpreters required to ensure effective communication and coordination not only at the headquarters level but also “in the field.” However, given the small size of the contingent, these issues were resolved on the spot.
The fact that the North Koreans had their own sector of operations helped avoid the risk of the KPA being used as a tool to solve internal problems. Had North Korean units been subordinated to Russian formations and placed under Russian command, Russian commanders might have faced a dilemma when tasked with conducting operations likely to result in significant casualties: should they send their own subordinates or deploy well-prepared foreign troops?
Everyone recognized this issue, and it’s no coincidence that enemy propaganda actively promoted the narrative of North Koreans being used as cannon fodder. Meanwhile, gaining effective combat experience as a unit is only possible through rotation after reaching an acceptable loss threshold. A unit that suffers excessive casualties cannot pass on its experience to newly arrived reinforcements or upon returning to permanent duty stations.
However, it appears that the Russian authorities opted for a different strategy: the North Koreans were given their own sector and operated there more or less independently.
There was also concern about how Russian society would react to North Korean assistance.
Although Article 20 of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership specifically addresses the issue of “strengthening coordination in countering disinformation and aggressive information campaigns,” a significant portion of the Russian population remains influenced by long-standing anti-Pyongyang propaganda, and the image of North Korea in the public consciousness remains rather odious.
In this context, the opposing side counted on a reputational blow to the Russian leadership: the internationalization of the war would be perceived by part of Russian society as proof that Moscow lacked the strength to secure victory in Ukraine on its own and was therefore forced to enlist such allies – despite the fact that the military operation is regarded by many as an internal matter for Russia.
Read more ‘Not a single North Korean violated his oath’: How our allies helped us liberate KurskHowever, the absence of North Koreans from the public eye meant the issue was barely discussed, and the narrative of “nothing would have worked without them” never took hold in the public consciousness. Additionally, the negative perception of the DPRK was partly offset by rhetoric about combat brotherhood, the understanding that their presence could reduce overall casualties, and the lack of any reports of misconduct by the North Korean troops.
The limited role assigned to the KPA also helped reduce the risk of further internationalization of the conflict. The West could have used the “North Korean card” to justify sending a NATO contingent to Ukraine “in response to the KPA invasion.” However, from, nothing the West could have interpreted as an “invasion of Ukraine” by North Korean forces occurred. Additionally, the new US policy and the EU’s unwillingness to accept serious risks played a role in tempering the response.
As for the so-called “reputational risks for Russia,” from the Western perspective, Russia has already been cast as a menacing superpower that has seized half the world and hungrily eyes the other half. The level of demonization and Russophobia in the West is so extreme that the involvement of the KPA is unlikely to have any critical impact on Russia’s image.
It is also worth noting that the situation did not provoke a new surge of tension in East Asia. Military activity within the Washington–Tokyo–Seoul triangle has continued at the same pace as under the Biden administration, and the South Korean leadership is primarily concerned not with the presence of North Korean soldiers on Russia’s western borders, but with the risk of breakthrough military technologies being transferred to the DPRK. The US course toward creating an Asian equivalent of NATO or expanding NATO eastward has not accelerated as a result.
What’s next?
The recognition of military cooperation has undoubtedly strengthened the ties between the two countries, and in this context, South Korean media are actively discussing whether Kim Jong-un will attend the Victory Day Parade in May or the Eastern Economic Forum in the fall. There is no direct confirmation of this yet, but the participation of DPRK military personnel in the May celebrations appears likely.
Read more Moscow hails North Korean ‘solidarity’ in Kursk Region liberationThe combat brotherhood will be glorified: most likely, distinguished members of the KPA will receive Russian military honors, and a monument will be erected in the DPRK, similar to those dedicated to Soviet soldiers or Chinese People’s Volunteers.
To this, we can add the rise of popular mythologization. Thanks to the efforts of both enemy propaganda and patriotic bloggers, North Koreans in the SMO have become part of the “barracks legends” – the kind of stories told in the gear room.
Military cooperation itself is also unlikely to come to an end, though the form it will take remains an interesting topic for discussion. The more probable scenario is that the training of soldiers and officers on Russian territory will continue and become more open, but without direct combat involvement.
A less likely possibility is that KPA personnel will continue to provide assistance, although an increase in the size of the North Korean contingent and/or its deployment beyond the pre-2022 Russian borders would raise concerns related to the costs and risks outlined above.
At the same time, the KPA in reality and the KPA in the post-truth world will remain two different entities. Those who want to see North Koreans – even where they are not present – will find them, and everyone will believe in the version of events that suits them best.
What about the situation on the Korean Peninsula? The demonstration of the Moscow–Pyongyang alliance reduces the risk of an armed conflict, similar to the dynamics of the Cold War.
Our side will not strike first, and the risks of a regional conflict escalating into a broader or nuclear confrontation are simply too high. As for everything else – we should watch the level of confrontation between the US and China, which will require Donald Trump to coordinate with allies, as well as the policy of South Korea’s future president.
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