Manchester United are committed to playing out from the back, but it’s getting harder to know if that’s because they think it works or they just don’t have an alternative plan.
Given Manchester United’s 4-1 defeat at Newcastle on Sunday confirmed 2024-25 will be the club’s worst in the Premier League era even with six games to go, the loss itself provided a succinct summary of where they’re at.
Even if United win all six of their remaining league games this season (they’ve only won 10 of 32 until now), they’ll still finish two points shy of the 58 they managed in 2021-22, which at the time was seen as a damning indictment of their decline.
But many United fans had already long accepted this Premier League campaign was beyond saving, with their run in the UEFA Europa League the only shred of hope to restore some dignity in a broader sense.
Despite United being in a relatively sound position heading into the second leg of their Europa League quarter-final with Lyon and therefore not being far off the final, it’s scarcely believable that they could win anything of note considering their dismal form and ability to shoot themselves in the foot.
The first leg was a prime example, with both Lyon goals in the 2-2 draw coming from André Onana errors. Then on Sunday, United couldn’t cope with Newcastle’s rabid pressing and that led to three of the Magpies’ four goals.
While the focus of late has largely been on the errors committed by Onana in shot-stopping terms, Altay Bayindir’s mistake for Newcastle’s fourth goal on Sunday shone a light on a wider stylistic issue.
With Newcastle pressing high, the Turkey international attempted a cute, slightly more direct ball into the middle of his own half…
But instead, he landed the ball right on the forehead of Joelinton, who nodded into the path of Bruno Guimarães…
And Bruno had little difficulty slotting past Bayindir…
So, not only did they struggle to effectively play out from the back, but when they tried to do something slightly different by going long, they were arguably even less effective at making the ball stick. It left some fundamental elements of their strategy seemingly at odds with each other.
Joshua Zirkzee enjoyed some eye-catching moments before his second-half withdrawal due to injury. He was bullied by Fabian Schär and Dan Burn when United tried to go direct to him, however, further evidence (if needed) of how he just isn’t suited to being that out-ball in attack – no one in the squad is.
Newcastle ended the match having recorded three high turnovers (winning possession within 40 metres of the opposition’s goal) leading to a goal, which is the joint most by a team in a single Premier League game this season.
Now, it is worth noting that before Sunday, United had only conceded one such goal under Ruben Amorim in the league. No problem here, then, just a freak occurrence, right?
Well, not really. It’s most instructive to look a bit deeper than just the high turnovers that lead to goals.
In terms of shot-ending high turnovers against since Amorim took over, United’s 25 is slightly above the Premier League average (24), but it’s not alarming.
However, United’s opponents have recorded 196 high turnovers in total over the same period, which is the third most behind only Tottenham (207) and Ipswich Town (199).
The fact that only 12.8% – the third-lowest proportion in the league – of them resulted in shots suggests United are relatively efficient at regrouping and preventing their opponents turning those situations into goalscoring opportunities, likely helped by having a back three, though you don’t have to concede a shot to have been put into an awkward or tense position. And it’s certainly difficult to frame any of this in a positive light after Sunday.
Granted, teams who play out from the back are always likely to have more high turnovers recorded against them – that’s simply the danger of having lots of the ball in your own half.
Many see the risk as worth the reward, however. If you can intricately slice through the opposition’s high press, you’re suddenly on the front foot and have your opponents backtracking, with their defence potentially exposed.
The issue for United, however, is they’re not very effective at getting themselves into those situations.
Over the course of the 2024-25 season, United have recorded over 300 more passes in their own defensive half (8,380) than any other team. That equates to 47.8% of their total passes, which is the second greatest proportion of all Premier League clubs this term.
That doesn’t automatically mean they’re bad at playing out from the back, but it does feed into the idea that they struggle to incisively pass through teams and are therefore forced to string together long passing sequences in their own half, where they can’t do much harm.
Of course, a key part of United’s attempts to build from the back is the role of the goalkeeper. Onana was brought in nearly two years ago with the objective of improving their passing in the defensive third, but that influence can only go so far.
In an ideal world, a team that plays out from the back wants every goal-kick they take to ultimately lead to an uninterrupted possession sequence that then yields a goal – obviously the reality is rather different, but that’s the objective.
United do go long from goal-kicks fairly often, as the graphic below shows, but there’s still considerable focus on playing short.
Jonathan Manuel / Data AnalystHowever, United have seen only 12 goal-kicks played within their defensive third lead to a sequence that reaches the attacking third, let alone yield a goal – just two Premier League teams have reached the final third less often from similar scenarios.
It’s slightly less damning when that’s framed as a proportion of their total goal-kicks played within their defensive third, with their 11.7% being the seventh worst, though it still paints a negative picture of their ability to play through opponents.
Ten of those 12 instances of reaching the final third came after goal-kicks passed within the penalty area – that equates to 10.2% of all goal-kicks kept inside their area, which is the fourth-smallest proportion.
This is despite United averaging the third-most passes (5.2) following a goal-kick passed inside the box. So, plenty of passes, but not much ground gained.
Of course, this all reflects the general difficulty United have in effectively playing through the lines pretty much all over the pitch – it’s certainly not limited to building out from goal-kicks.
Looking again more specifically at United since Amorim arrived in November, they have recorded 52 build-up attacks (sequences of 10+ passes ending with a touch in the opposition’s box or a shot), which sees them rank ninth in the Premier League.
That’s not terrible, but the likes of Manchester City (109) and Arsenal (103) have managed over 100, and United are one of only two teams yet to score from such a passage of play.
These 52 build-up attacks come from a total of 257 passing sequences of at least 10 passes in length, so 20.2% lead to a touch in the opposition’s box or a shot; that’s below the league average (22.3%).
None of this reflects particularly well on their incisiveness, does it? And it doesn’t stop there.
Their open-play passing sequences comprise 3.9 passes on average, which is the fifth most in the Premier League, and the average duration of their sequences is 10.9 seconds, the sixth longest.
But they have great difficulty in working the ball upfield, as their passing sequences progress the play just 10.7m on average – only Crystal Palace (9.4m) are less effective in that respect.
Jonathan Manuel / Data AnalystIn short, then, United are a team who want to build from the back but are highly ineffective at turning that mentality into meaningful pressure because they’re ineffective at progressing the play – which obviously isn’t helped by Lisandro Martínez’s prolonged absence. The additional issue is that they don’t really have the alternative of being direct – at least not in the conventional sense.
Among outfielders to have played at least 900 minutes and contested a minimum of 30 aerial duels, only four players have a poorer aerial success rate than Rasmus Højlund (21.1%), and Zirkzee (29.9%) is only six places better off in those rankings.
Similarly, among outfielders to have contested at least 50 duels in a broader sense, Højlund (29%) and Zirkzee (32.6%) are both in the bottom three for success rate.
Jonathan Manuel / Data AnalystOf course, playing direct doesn’t have to mean always looking for a centre-forward to get flick-ons or hold the ball up, but that’s the way United have frequently looked to use those two strikers, and it simply hasn’t worked.
The lack of a high-quality deep-lying playmaker obviously impacts United’s ability to play out from the back. Manuel Ugarte has his uses but he’s not the type to get the ball off the centre-backs and dictate the play; Kobbie Mainoo is probably the player best suited to such a role given his assuredness under pressure, but he’s only just returned from a lengthy spell out and is likely to have a future in a more advanced role.
Amorim’s been clear that he’ll not change his principles, however, and that presumably extends to his team’s possession habits in their own half.
Maybe with a bit more time Manchester United will improve in that respect – they seemingly can’t get much more ineffective than they already are.
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Laying Bare the Ineffectiveness of Man Utd’s Attempts to Play Out from the Back Opta Analyst.
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