The fall of Syria's former President Bashar al-Assad in December, overthrown by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led coalition, now headed by interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa, marked a significant shift in the region, dealing a major setback to Iran.
Following the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel and Israel's military response in Gaza and Lebanon, the Iran-led axis of resistance faced significant setbacks, though they still maintain considerable influence in the region.
However, the loss of Syria as a strategic ally is now forcing Tehran to rethink its approach to this new reality.
Although Syria wasn't a direct military ally against Israel within the axis of resistance's framework, it was a key part of Iran's coalition, providing a crucial link to Lebanon for supporting Hezbollah.
During the 2011 uprisings and civil war, Assad relied on Iran and Hezbollah for military and economic support, which helped stabilise his rule. As a result, Syria became vital to Iran's regional network, connecting Iran, Lebanon, and Iraq, with Iran estimated to have spent between $30 and $50 billion in Syria since 2011.
However, Assad's collapse, along with the failure of his backers, Iran and Russia, to intervene effectively, and setbacks for Iran's axis of resistance against Israel, have weakened Tehran's influence in Syria, forcing a strategic shift.
Alex Vatanka, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute with a focus on Iran, told The New Arab that it is uncertain whether Iran has the capacity or plan to come back to influence Syria, given logistical challenges and Israeli opposition.
"They're under the microscope, with the Israeli Air Force stopping them. Even if Iran wanted to do so, it's not sure if it can," he said.
Iran's Syria policy is adapting pragmatically to the new reality. While Iran publicly supports Syria's sovereignty, stability, and unity while condemning the Israeli occupation of Syrian territories, the two countries have had no formal engagement, with the new Syrian government being cautious in establishing diplomatic ties with Iran in the short term.
Inside Iran, opinions on the new Syria differ. Hardliners view Syria's government as a Turkish-backed terrorist threat, advocating for destabilisation, while others see Syria as a costly burden and support disengagement, according to Sina Toossi, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy.
"While Iran has stepped back, there are still ongoing discussions and some substantial discourse about Syria within the country," he told TNA.
Iran's strategic interest in Syria focuses on maintaining the axis of resistance by supporting Hezbollah through Syria and maintaining influence in the region. However, its ability to return is limited by Israeli and US surveillance, the lack of a secure land corridor, and the Syrian new political landscape.
Sanam Vakil, Director of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House, told TNA Iran is still weighing its approach, as the Syrian government has set a red line in engaging with Iran.
"They're rightly very suspicious, but also so many of the Arab and international stakeholders have conditioned aid or sanctions relief on keeping Iran out of Syria. So it's a very difficult set of relationships for Iran to navigate or make quick progress on," she said.
Iran's interest in Syria also involves the protection of the Shia community, including the Alawites, an offshoot of Shi'ite Islam who make up about 10% of Syria's population and to which the ousted Assad belongs.
After Assad's fall in December, Syria's Alawite and Shiite communities, once beneficiaries of his rule, faced uncertainty under Sunni Islamist control, with many fleeing and others losing influence and security.
They also experienced their worst bloodshed since Assad's fall last week.
The violence escalated on 6 March when pro-Assad fighters opposing the new government attacked interim security forces along Syria's Alawite-majority coastline.
In response, the Sunni Islamist-led government sent reinforcements, leading to increased sectarian violence against civilians. Over 1,000 people were killed, mainly Alawites, with reports also citing clashes also involving “armed groups allied with HTS.”
Despite some reports suggesting Iranian involvement, there is no evidence linking Iran to the violence. Iran has condemned the attacks and rejected allegations that it or any allied group was behind the violence or had any involvement, while Syria's government has vowed to punish those responsible for the mass killings.
Ayameen Jawad al-Tamimi, a research fellow at Middle East Forum, told TNA while Iranians may not view the Syrian government favourably, there's no evidence they're secretly collaborating with remnants to incite an uprising.
"Some individuals involved in attacks on government forces may have worked with Iranians in the past, but I don't believe Iran is currently coordinating the attacks," he said.
Other experts reached by TNA also dismissed allegations of Iranian involvement in the violence due to a lack of evidence.
Reports alleging Iran's involvement in disrupting Syria's new course extended beyond supporting Assad regime remnants.
Some suggested Iran sought cooperation with Kurdish parties like the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the PKK, which Iran itself has designated as a terrorist group. While these claims lack evidence, they have been discussed by Turkey, a regional actor gaining influence in Syria since Assad's fall.
In a 26 February interview with Al Jazeera Arabic, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan criticised Iran's reliance on militias, calling it 'dangerous,' and warned that interfering in other countries could lead to retaliation. "If you do not want stones thrown at your window, you will not throw stones at someone else's window," he said.
In the following days, Iran and Turkey summoned each other's envoys following a diplomatic spat. Iranian officials called Turkey's remarks unconstructive.
Despite both countries seeking strong ties, the dispute between Iran and Turkey underscores regional rivalries, particularly as Turkey's influence in Syria expands.
Turkey-Iran: Counterbalance
As Iran's role recedes, Turkey emerges as a key player, opposing Israel's presence in Syria and supporting Islamist factions in Syria, who, while primarily fighting Assad, are also critical of Israel.
Turkey's influence in the country was reinforced by the Kurdish-led SDF's recent deal with Damascus to integrate into state institutions, following PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan's call for the disbanding of PKK-affiliated groups.
The rivalry between Turkey and Iran over Syria presents both challenges and opportunities for Iran as it adapts to Turkey's growing influence in the region, according to Toossi.
"If this deal holds, Israel could be the biggest loser, while Iran must decide whether to engage diplomatically with Syria's new leadership or exploit potential instability to expand its influence, as it has done in past conflicts by building allied militias like Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen," he said.
In the search for a way to reactivate its networks in Syria, Vakil explained that Iran "may look for entry points to revive its economic influence, potentially to show support for the new government and avoid being marginalised," or, alternatively, "play the role of a spoiler." However, she noted, "I don't think it's in its immediate interest to do so under maximum pressure." Looking further ahead, Vakil suggested, "We could see Iran stoke dissent or attempt to exploit divisions."
In discussing the potential for dialogue between Iran and Syria, Vatanka noted that Iran's approach may be less about bilateral relations and more about Qatar and other Gulf States pushing for Iran to have a seat at the table in order to prevent it from undermining their plans for Syria's future.
"The real influence may come from Gulf states, particularly Qatar, which might push for giving Iran a small role in the process to prevent it from becoming a spoiler. However, deep mistrust exists between Iran and Shara, as Iran views Shara as a former Sunni jihadist with ties to Al-Qaeda," he said.
Though still distant, there is also potential for Iran and the new Syrian government to find common ground in opposing Israeli presence in southern Syria.
Toossi explained that Sharaa could use the threat of aligning with Iran as leverage against the US and Israel. This could depend on the relationship between Sahraa and Hamas, as the Palestinian group has closer ties to Iran, influencing Syria's future ties with Tehran. If instability continues in Western Syria, Sharaa may have to accept some Iranian influence to stabilise the region. Diplomatic channels could offer Iran opportunities to establish security and political relations with Syria's interim government if Sharaa seeks Iranian help for stability.
"However, the overall trajectory will depend on internal Syrian stability and how Syrian relations with Israel evolve," he said.
Dario Sabaghi is a freelance journalist interested in human rights. Follow him on Twitter: @DarioSabaghi
Read More Details
Finally We wish PressBee provided you with enough information of ( Borderline disorder: Is Iran destabilising post-Assad Syria? )
Also on site :